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L Introduction
Someone violates the federal insider trading prohibition only if his
trading activity breached a fiduciary duty owed either to the investor with
whom he trades or to the source of the information. ' From a securities law
perspective, the federal prohibition thus is an empty shell. It has no force
or substance until it has been filled with fiduciary duty concepts.
Despite the centrality of the fiduciary duty element to the federal
prohibition, the fiduciary element has received relatively little attention from
courts or commentators. On close examination, however, requiring a breach
of fiduciary duty as a prerequisite for insider trading liability raises two
interesting questions: What is the precise fiduciary duty at issue? Is the
source of that duty federal or state law? Despite over a decade of experience
1. This is true insofar as the core federal prohibition under Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1993), is concerned. Breach of
fiduciary duty is not required for liability to arise under the narrower provisions of SEC Rule
14e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1993). See generally infra part II.
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with the fiduciary duty requirement, neither of these questions has a clear
and convincing answer.
The failure to resolve these issues has robbed the federal insider trading
prohibition of coherence and predictability. 2 Perhaps this lack of coherence
was acceptable when insider trading was a low priority item for federal
prosecutors, and the major penalty was disgorgement of profits. Today,
however, insider trading is a major Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC or Commission) enforcement target and carries penalties that can only
be described as draconian.' Due process and simple fairness thus require
that the fiduciary duty element be taken more seriously than it has been to
date.
Perhaps the fiduciary duty requirement's substantive content is ignored
because courts and commentators assume that there is a single fiduciary
duty, applicable to all relevant market players, that proscribes the use of
confidential information for personal gain. If so, this assumption's inherent
invalidity was exposed by the SEC's enforcement effort directed at insider
trading in corporate debt securities.4 Under state law, corporate officers and
directors generally owe no fiduciary duties to debt securityholders. As a
result, assuming state law provides the requisite fiduciary duty, one can
plausibly argue that insider trading in debt securities is not unlawful. As this
Article will demonstrate, similar state law arguments can be made in a
variety of contexts, including the very core of the federal prohibition - its
application to corporate officers and directors. This possibility has generated
some critical commentary in the debt security context,5 but its full implica-
tions remain largely unexplored. This Article seeks to fill that gap.
Part II of this Article briefly traces the evolution of the current insider
trading regime, with particular emphasis on the fiduciary duty element. Part
III then explores the content of the fiduciary duty element. Part I argues
2. See generally Robert D. Rosenbaum & Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Corporate
Takeover Game and Recent Legislative Attempts to Define Insider Trading, 26 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 229 (1988).
3. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Note, A Critique of the Insider Trading
Sanctions Act of 1984, 71 VA. L. Rv. 455 (1985).
4. For discussion of the SEC's enforcement efforts with respect to debt securities, see
Barbara A. Mallon & Dexter B. Johnson, Insider Trading in Non-Equity Securities, 26 REv.
SEC. COMM. REG. 147 (1993); Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufnanis, Insider Trading and
Junk Bonds, N.Y.L.J., May 16, 1991, at 1.
5. See, e.g., Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufinanis, A Tale of Two Instruments:
Insider Trading in Non-Equity Securities, 49 Bus. LAw. 187 (1993); R. Rene Pengra, Note,
Lnsider Trading, Debt Securities, and Rule 10b-5: Evaluating the Fiduciary Relationship, 67
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1354 (1992).
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that liability is premised not on the mere existence of a fiduciary relation-
ship, but rather on the breach of a specific fiduciary duty - namely, the
duty to refrain from self-dealing in confidential information owned by
another party.
The inquiry then shifts to identifying the source of the requisite duty.
As a preliminary matter, Part IV argues that the insider trading prohibition
is a species of federal common law. Specifically, it is an example of
interstitial lawmaking in which the courts are using common-law adjudica-
tory methods to flesh out Rule 10b-5's bare bones. Once this view of the
prohibition is accepted, a choice of law question arises. In crafting a rule of
decision for federal common-law cases, courts can either create a unique
federal standard or incorporate state law into the federal rule. In the latter
case, the cause of action remains federal, but the content of federal law is
supplied by the incorporated state law principles. The decision to incorpo-
rate state law depends upon whether there are important federal interests that
would be adversely affected by doing so. If so, the court will create a
uniform federal standard, but if not, the court may incorporate state law.
In order to decide whether state fiduciary duties should be incorporated
into the federal insider trading prohibition, we thus must ask two questions:
Would incorporation adversely affect prosecution of insider trading under
the federal securities laws and, if so, would any identifiable policy goal of
those laws be frustrated thereby? Part V addresses the former concern,
examining the implications of adopting state law fiduciary duty concepts as
the rule of decision. It demonstrates that use of state law principles will at
least complicate insider trading prosecutions and probably will substantially
limit the prohibition's scope.
In light of that finding, Part VI then turns to the latter concern.
Because a unique federal set of fiduciary duties applicable to insider trading
is most easily justified if application of state law would frustrate an
identifiable federal policy goal, Part VI examines the purported federal
interests underlying the insider trading prohibition. As Part VI demon-
strates, none of the commonly asserted federal policies requires creation of
a unique set of federal fiduciary duties. Rather, the insider trading prohibi-
tion is justified solely by the need to protect property rights in valuable
information.
Based on this analysis, Part VI argues that it is creation of a unique
federal rule - not incorporation of state law principles - that would
frustrate the policies of the securities laws. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly made clear that the federal securities laws do not displace the
much broader body of state corporate law. To the contrary, the Court has
1192
FIDUCIARYDUTIES
specifically indicated that questions of fiduciary duty are governed by state
law. If the fiduciary duty necessary for insider trading liability is supplied
by federal law, a substantial tension thus would develop between the insider
trading prohibition and the federalism policies of the securities laws.
Incorporating state law fiduciary duties into the prohibition would resolve
that tension. Moreover, state law fiduciary duties are generally consistent
with the property rights rationale for regulating insider trading. Accord-
ingly, incorporating state law fiduciary duties would advance the federalism
policies of the federal securities laws, without frustrating any of the other
policies thereof.
1. An Overview of the Law of Insider Trading
Generally speaking, insider trading is trading in securities while in
possession of material nonpublic information.6 At present, there are three
basic theories under which trading on inside information becomes unlawful.
The disclose or abstain rule and the misappropriation theory were created by
the courts under Section 10(b)7 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
amended (Exchange Act) and Rule 10b-5' thereunder. Pursuant to its rule-
making authority under Exchange Act Section 14(e),9 the SEC adopted Rule
14e-310 to proscribe insider trading involving information relating to tender
offers. With the exception of Rule 14e-3, each of these theories requires that
the transaction involve a breach of fiduciary duty.
6. Nonpublic information, for purposes of Rule lOb-5, takes two principal forms:
"inside information" and "market information." Market information typically originates from
nonissuer sources and involves events or circumstances concerning or affecting the price or
market for the issuer's securities and does not concern the issuer's assets or earning power.
This distinction is unimportant for our purposes because insider trading liability can be
imposed on those who trade while in possession of either type. See Bainbridge, supra note
3, at 477 n.177 (citing authorities).
In theory, a distinction can be drawn between trading while in possession of material
nonpublic information and trading on the basis of such information. See id. at 493-97. Such
a distinction, however, turns out to be a most difficult one to draw in practice. For this
reason, trading while in possession of material nonpublic information generally suffices for
liability to arise under the federal securities laws (assuming the other elements of the offense
are met). See United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112, 120-21 (2d Cir.) (dictum), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 467 (1993).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1993).
8. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1993).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1993).
10. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1993).
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A. The Disclose or Abstain Rule
The modern federal insider prohibition began taking form in SEC v.
Texas GulfpS~hur Co.n" TGS, as it is commonly known, rested on a policy
of equality of access to information. Accordingly, under TGS and its
progeny, virtually anyone that possessed material nonpublic information was
required either to disclose it to the investment public before trading or
abstain from trading in the affected company's securities."2 If the would-be
trader's fiduciary duties precluded him from disclosing the information prior
to trading, abstention was the only option.
In Chiarella v. United States3 and Dirks v. SEC,14 the Supreme Court
rejected the equal access policy. Instead, the Court made clear that liability
could be imposed only if the defendant was subject to a duty to disclose prior
to trading. Inside traders thus were no longer liable merely because they had
more information than other investors in the market place. Instead, a duty
to disclose only arose where the inside traders breached a pre-existing fiduci-
ary duty owed to the person with whom they traded. 5
As we shall see, creation of this fiduciary duty element substantially
narrowed the scope of the disclose or abstain rule.' 6 But the rule remains
quite expansive in a number of respects. In particular, it is not limited to
true insiders, such as officers, directors, and controlling shareholders, but
picks up corporate outsiders in two important ways. Even in these
situations, however, liability for insider trading under the disclose or abstain
rule exists only where the trader - insider or outsider - violates a fiduciary
duty owed to the person on the other side of the transaction.
First, the rule can pick up a wide variety of nominal outsiders whose
relationship to the issuer is sufficiently close to justify treating them as "con-
11. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). Prior to TGS, the
federal prohibition was effectively limited to face-to-face and control transactions. See infra
note 176 and accompanying text. Secondary market transactions were regulated only in SEC
administrative proceedings. Id.
12. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968).
13. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
14. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
15. 'When an allegation of fraud is based upon nondisclosure, there can be no fraud
absent a duty to speak," and no such duty arises "from the mere possession of nonpublic
market information." Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234-35 (1980). Thus, "there
can be no duty to disclose where the person who has traded on [or tipped] inside information
'was not [the corporation's] agent .... was not a fiduciary, [or] was not a person in whom
the sellers [of the securities] had placed their trust and confidence.'" Id. at 232; accord Dirks
v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653-55 (1983).
16. See infra part I.B.
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structive insiders," but only in rather narrow circumstances. The outsider
must obtain material nonpublic information from the issuer. The issuer must
expect the outsider to keep the disclosed information confidential. Finally,
the relationship must at least imply such a duty. If these conditions are met,
the putative outsider will be deemed a "constructive insider" and subjected
to the disclose or abstain rule in full measure. 7 If these conditions are not
met, however, the disclose or abstain rule simply does not apply. The
critical issue thus remains the nature of the relationship between the parties.
Second, the rule also picks up outsiders that receive inside information
from either true insiders or constructive insiders. There are a number of
restrictions on tippee liability, however. Most important for present
purposes, the tippee's liability is derivative of the tipper's, "arising from his
role as a participant after the fact in the insider's breach of a fiduciary
duty."18 As a result, the mere fact of a tip is not sufficient to result in
liability. What is proscribed is not merely a breach of confidentiality by the
insider, but rather a breach of the duty of loyalty imposed on all fiduciaries
to avoid personally profiting from information entrusted to them.' 9 Thus,
looking at objective criteria, the courts must determine whether the insider
personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure.' So once
again, a breach of fiduciary duty is essential for liability to be imposed: A
tippee can be held liable only when the tipper has breached a fiduciary duty
by disclosing information to the tippee, and the tippee knows or has reason
to know of the breach of duty.2
B. The Gap-Fillers
Chiarella created a variety of significant gaps in the insider trading
prohibition's coverage. Consider this standard law school hypothetical: A
law firm is hired by Raider Corporation to represent it in connection with a
planned takeover bid for Target Company. Alex Associate is one of the
lawyers assigned to the project. Before Raider publicly discloses its inten-
tions, Associate purchases a substantial block of Target stock. Under the
disclose or abstain rule, he has not violated the insider trading prohibition.
Whatever the scope of the duties he owed Raider, he owed no duty to the
shareholders of Target. Accordingly, the requisite breach of fiduciary duty
17. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655 n.14.
18. Id. at 659.
19. See id. at 662-64.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 660.
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is not present in his transaction. Rule 14e-3 and the misappropriation theory
were created to fill this gap.
1. Rule 14e-3
Rule 14e-3 was the SEC's immediate response to Chiarella.' The rule
prohibits insiders of the bidder and target from divulging confidential
information about a tender offer to persons that are likely to violate the rule
by trading on the basis of that information.' The rule also, with certain
narrow and well-defined exceptions, prohibits any person that possesses
material information relating to a tender offer by another person from
trading in target company securities if the bidder has commenced or has
taken substantial steps towards commencement of the bid.'
According to the SEC, Rule 14e-3 liability is not premised on breach
of a fiduciary duty. In light of the well-established fiduciary duty require-
ment under Rule lOb-5, however, this interpretation of the rule may run
afoul of Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc.,' 5 in which the Supreme
Court held that Exchange Act Sections 10(b) and 14(e) are in pari materia.
In United States v. Chestman,'- however, the Second Circuit upheld Rule
14e-3 as a valid exercise of the SEC's rulemaking authority despite the ab-
sence of a fiduciary duty element.
Even assuming the SEC and the Second Circuit are correct on this
point, however, the rule's scope is very limited. One prong of the rule (the
prohibition on trading while in possession of material nonpublic information)
does not apply until the offeror has taken substantial steps towards making
the offer. More important, both prongs of the rule are limited to information
relating to a tender offer. As a result, most types of inside information
remain subject to the duty-based analysis of Chiarella and its progeny.
2. Misappropriation
The misappropriation theory grew out of then Chief Justice Burger's
dissent in Chiarella. As an employee of a financial printer, Chiarella had
access to tender offer documents being prepared for takeover bidders.
22. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1993). In fact, Rule 14e-3 was pending at the time
Chiarella was decided, see Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234 n.18 (1980), almost
as though the Commission knew that its attempts to reach warehousing of takeover securities
under Rule lOb-5 were of questionable validity.
23. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(d) (1993).
24. Id. § 240.14e-3(a).
25. 472 U.S. 1 (1985).
26. 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en bane), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992).
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Although Chiarella owed no duties to the investors with whom he traded, he
did owe a duty of confidentiality to his employer and thereby to the bidders.
Chief Justice Burger argued that Chiarella's misappropriation of material
nonpublic information that had been entrusted to his employer constituted a
breach of duty sufficient to justify imposing Rule lOb-5 liability.27 Although
Justice Brennan and Justices Blackmun and Marshall29 supported the Chief
Justice's argument, the majority declined to reach the misappropriation ques-
tion because that theory of liability Was not presented to the jury.' The
Second Circuit nevertheless adopted the misappropriation theory as a basis
for inside trading liability in United States v. Newman31 and followed it in
a number of subsequent decisions.32
Like the traditional disclose or abstain rule, the misappropriation theory
requires a breach of fiduciary duty before trading on inside information be-
comes unlawful.33 The fiduciary relationship in question, however, is a quite
different one. Under the misappropriation theory, the defendant need not
owe a fiduciary duty to the investor with whom he trades. Nor must he owe
a fiduciary duty to the issuer of the securities that were traded. Instead, the
misappropriation theory applies when the inside trader violates a fiduciary
duty owed to the source of the information.' Had the misappropriation
theory been available against Chiarella, for example, his conviction could
have been upheld even though he owed no duties to those with whom he had
traded. Instead, the breach of the duty he owed to Pandick Press would have
sufficed.
M. What Is the Requisite Fiduciary Duty?
In neither Chiarella nor Dirks did the Supreme Court do a very good
job of defining the fiduciary duty element. Nor have the lower courts subse-
27. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 240-43 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 239 (Brennan, J., concurring).
29. Id. at 245 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 235-37. In his concurrence, Justice Stevens indicated that "respectable argu-
ments could be made" for and against the misappropriation theory. Id. at 238 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
31. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
32. E.g., United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), aff'd on other
grounds, 484 U.S. 19 (1987); SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1053 (1985).
33. It is not unlawful, for example, to trade on the basis of inadvertently overheard
information. SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756, 766 (W.D. Okla. 1984).
34. Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1028-29.
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quently done much to flesh out the requirement. To the contrary, most
decisions treat the fiduciary duty element conclusorily at best. The SEC and
the lower courts seem to view the fiduciary duty element as a mere minor
inconvenience that should not stand in the way of expansive insider trading
liability. They have consistently sought to evade the spirit of the fiduciary
duty requirement, while complying with its letter. Consider, for example,
the creation of the misappropriation theory and Rule 14e-3 as a means of
recriminalizing the conduct legalized by Chiarella The misappropriation
theory and Rule 14e-3 are best viewed as part of a SEC effort to revive the
TGS equal access to information rule while nominally remaining faithful to
the fiduciary duty requirement. Even a former SEC Commissioner admits
as much, acknowledging that the misappropriation theory can be seen as
"merely a pretext for enforcing equal opportunity in information."31
This persistent refusal to take the fiduciary duty requirement seriously
is problematic in light of the centrality of the fiduciary duty requirement to
the Supreme Court's insider trading jurisprudence and the Court's explicit
rejection of the equal access policy. In view of the draconian sanctions
associated with insider trading liability, moreover, the failure to meaning-
fully define the scope and content of the fiduciary duty element raises im-
portant fairness and due process concerns. This Part outlines the framework
within which such a definition should evolve by exploring the nature of the
fiduciary duty at issue.
In the course of its Chiarella and Dirks opinions, the Supreme Court
frequently spoke of the need to show the existence of a "fiduciary relation-
ship" as a predicate to liability.37 Yet, surely that is not enough. As Justice
35. See supra part ll.B.2.
36. Charles C. Cox & Kevin S. Fogarty, Bases of Insider Trading Law, 49 OHIO ST.
L.J. 353, 366 (1988). For a summary of the arguments that equal access to information is
not an appropriate basis for imposition of insider trading liability, see Stephen M. Bainbridge,
The Insider Trading Prohibition: A Legal and Economic Enigma, 38 U. FLA. L. REV. 35, 57-
59 (1986).
37. E.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445
U.S. 222, 232 (1980). In United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991), the court
observed that the requisite relationship could be satisfied either by a fiduciary relationship or
a "similar relationship of trust and confidence." Id. at 568. So expanding the class of
relationships that can give rise to liability may lead to a results-oriented approach. If a court
wishes to impose liability, it need simply conclude that the relationship in question involves
trust and confidence, even though the relationship bears no resemblance to those in which
fiduciary-like duties are normally imposed. Accordingly, courts should be loath to use this
phraseology as a mechanism for expanding the scope of liability. The Chestman court was
sensitive to this possibility, holding that a relationship of trust and confidence must be "the
functional equivalent of a fiduciary relationship" before liability can be imposed. Id. Chest-
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Frankfurter put it, albeit in a different context, "to say that a man is a fiduc-
iary only begins analysis; it gives direction to further inquiry. To whom is
he a fiduciary? What obligations does he owe as a fiduciary? In what re-
spect has he failed to discharge those obligations?"38 In other words, it
should not be enough to establish the existence of a fiduciary relationship.
Before liability can be imposed one must also establish that the defendant
violated a fiduciary duty arising out of the fiduciary relationship in ques-
tion.39
In any fiduciary relationship, a variety of duties may arise. Which is
the duty whose violation triggers insider trading liability? Again, the Court
was not very precise on this score. It spoke mainly of a duty to disclose
before trading.' While so describing the duty perhaps sufficed for purposes
of applying the disclose or abstain rule to trading insiders,4' it created
analytical problems when the insider tipped information rather than trading
on it. The duty to disclose phraseology created even greater problems when
the misappropriation theory was created. Given that Chiarella owed no
fiduciary duties to the investors with whom he traded, for example, he
plainly owed those investors no duty to disclose nonpublic information
before trading.
Faced with these problems, some lower courts switched the inquiry to
whether the defendant was subject to a duty of confidentiality. 2 This
man also indicates that regardless of which type of relationship is present the defendant must
be shown to have been subject to a duty (incorrectly described by the court as one of con-
fidentiality) and to have breached that duty. Id. at 569. Finally, the court indicated that at
least as to criminal cases, it would not expand the class of relationships from which liability
might arise to encompass those outside the traditional core of fiduciary obligation. See id.
at 570 (refusing to "apply the outer permutations of chancery relief"). Accordingly, this
article disregards any possible distinctions between fiduciary relationships and other relation-
ships of "trust and confidence."
38. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943).
39. This conclusion is supported by the Supreme Court's treatment of tippee liability.
It is not enough to show that the tipper was party to a fiduciary relationship with the source
of the information. As we have seen, there must also be a breach of the tipper's fiduciary
duty before tippee liability can result. That this requirement extends to insider trading
liability generally seems reasonably clear from Dirks's discussion of Chiarella. See Dirks,
463 U.S. at 653-54.
40. See, e.g., Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654; Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235.
41. Even as to the disclose or abstain rule, however, attempting to create a duty to
disclose independent of a duty not to self-deal is problematic. See infra part IV.
42. See, e.g., United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114
S. CL 467 (1993); United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1034 (2d Cir. 1986), aff'd on
other grounds, 484 U.S. 19 (1987). Note that these cases arose in the employment context,
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approach finds some support in Dirks's discussion of constructive insiders.
Recall that under Dirks one becomes a constructive insider only where the
outsider is expected to keep "nonpublic information confidential and the
relationship at least" implies a duty to do so.43
Using a duty of confidentiality as the requisite fiduciary duty, however,
makes little sense in the insider trading context. Unlike most types of
tangible property, the same piece of information can be used by more than
one person at the same time; an insider's use of the information, moreover,
does not necessarily lower its value to its owner. When an executive that
has just negotiated a major contract for his employer thereafter inside trades
in the employer's stock, for example, the value of the contract to the
employer has not been lowered nor, absent some act of disclosure, has the
executive violated his duty of confidentiality. Using nonpublic information
for personal gain thus is not inconsistent with a duty of confidentiality,
unless one's trades somehow reveal the information.
The fiduciary duty requirement therefore should be satisfied only by a
duty to refrain from self-dealing in nonpublic information. This conclusion
finds considerably greater support in Dirks than does the duty of confidenti-
ality approach. The Court, for example, described the elements of an insider
trading violation as: "(i) the existence of a relationship affording access to
inside information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose, and
(ii) the unfairness of allowing a corporate insider to take advantage of that
information by trading without disclosure. "' Another passage likewise
describes insider trading liability as arising from "the 'inherent unfairness
involved where one takes advantage' of 'information intended to be available
only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone.'
Yet another noted that insiders are "forbidden by their fiduciary relationship
from using undisclosed corporate information for their personal gain. "I The
focus in each instance is on the duty to refrain from self-dealing.
The emphasis on self-dealing, rather than confidentiality, is confirmed
by the result in Dirks. Secrist violated his duty of confidentiality by dis-
in which it is thought that an implicit duty to refrain from self-dealing is created by agency
law. See infra notes 150-53 and accompanying text. Those courts thus did not have to face,
let alone resolve, the potential disparity between a duty of confidentiality and a duty to refrain
from self-dealing.
43. Dirks, 463 U.S. at655 n.14.
44. Id. at 653 (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980)).
45. Id. at 654 (quoting In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C.
933, 936 (1968)).
46. Id. at 659.
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closing the information to Dirks. Yet, the fact of the tip alone did not
suffice for liability to be imposed. Rather, as we have seen, the court held
that liability could be imposed only if Secrist had made the tip for personal
gain, in other words, only if the tip involved self-dealing. Hence, mere
violation of the duty of confidentiality is not enough. Rather, a duty to
disclose before trading arises only if trading would violate a duty to refrain
from self-dealing in confidential information owed by the trader to the owner
of that information.
IV. Federal or State? The Choice of Law Problem
Having identified the requisite fiduciary duty, a question remains:
Whence comes that duty? Courts and commentators uniformly treat the
Chiarella fiduciary duty as a species of federal law. True enough, in the
sense that the underlying cause of action arises under federal law. But while
the prohibition is tied to a federal statute and the regulations thereunder,
there is nothing in either the text or legislative history of Exchange Act
Section 10(b) or Rule lOb-5 to support the modem substantive definition of
insider trading.47 Instead, it is wholly a judicial creation. Like the rest of
modem Rule lOb-5 jurisprudence, the definition of insider trading is "a
judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn."'
The federal insider trading prohibition thus is best classified within the genus
of federal common law.49 It is an example of interstitial lawmaking in which
the courts are using common-law adjudicatory methods to flesh out the bare
statutory bones.
This conclusion admittedly may run afoul of a series of recent Supreme
Court decisions in which the Court adopted a narrower approach to inter-
preting Rule 10b-5, which purports to focus on the text of the rule and Sec-
tion 10(b).1 Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank is perhaps the leading
47. See infra part VI.A.1.
48. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975). Even a
former SEC solicitor admits that "[m]odern development of the law of insider trading is a
classic example of common law in the federal courts. No statute defines insider trading; no
statute expressly makes it unlawful." Paul Gonson & David E. Butler, In Wake of 'Dirks,'
Courts Debate Definition of 'Insider,' LGAL TIMEs, Apr. 2, 1984, at 16.
49. Professor Theresa Gabaldon notes that federal courts have often borrowed state law
to define the elements of the implied cause of action under Rule lOb-5. Theresa A. Ga-
baldon, State Answers to Federal Questions: The Common Law of Federal Securities Regula-
tion, 20 J. CoRp. L. 156, 160 (1994). As I do, she treats the insider trading prohibition as
a species of federal common law in which courts should borrow state law. Id. at 198-99.
50. I shall not lengthen an already hefty article with an extended discourse on the merits
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exemplar of this trend." In that case, the Court overruled a host of prece-
dent imposing aiding and abetting liability under Rule lOb-5. In doing so,
the Court held that the scope of conduct prohibited by Section 10(b) (and
thus the rule) is controlled by the text of the statute.'
The Fourth Circuit recently extended Central Bank's logic to the insider
trading context. In United States v. Bryan,53 the Fourth Circuit rejected the
misappropriation theory as a basis for insider trading liability under Rule
lOb-5. Following Central Bank, the court held it could not expand "the
concept of fraud in the securities context beyond what the words of the Act
reasonably will bear. "' In turn, the court held that the statute imposes lia-
bility only where there has been "deception upon the purchaser or seller of
securities, or upon some other person intimately linked with or affected by
a securities transaction."55 Because the misappropriation theory involves no
such deception, but rather simply a breach of fiduciary duty owed to the
source of the information, the theory could not stand. 6
Bryan's extension of Central Bank to the insider trading context, and
consequent refusal to treat the prohibition as a species of federal common
law,' is problematic on several grounds. Although the Fourth Circuit was
careful to opine that its decision left intact both the disclose or abstain theory
of liability and tipping liability thereunder," arguably this is not the case.
As we have seen, the duty at issue in tipping cases is not a duty to disclose,
but rather, a duty to refrain from self-dealing in confidential information
owed by the tipper to the source of the information. As such, tipping is
subject to the same line of attack as the Bryan court invoked against the
misappropriation theory.
of a purely textualist approach to interpreting the securities laws. Instead, it suffices here
merely to point out some of the problems such an approach creates in the insider trading area
and, further, to suggest that treating the insider trading prohibition as a species of federal
common-law can be justified as being consistent with congressional intent. For a useful
treatment of the legitimacy of using common-law adjudicatory methodologies in federal
securities litigation, see generally id.
51. 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994).
52. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1446 (1994).
53. No. 94-5124, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 15893 (4th Cir. June 27, 1995).
54. United States v. Bryan, No. 94-5124, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 15893, at *33 (4th
Cir. June 27, 1995).
55. Id. at *50.
56. Id. at *50-51.
57. See id. (criticizing misappropriation theory on grounds that it converts Rule lob-5
into "federal common law governing and protecting any and all trust relationships").
58. Id. at *59-60.
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Even the basic disclose or abstain theory of liability is called into ques-
tion by Bryan. Granted, insider trading in violation of the disclose or
abstain rule involves an element of deception. By definition, the defendant
has failed to disclose nonpublic information before trading. As suggested by
my argument that the relevant fiduciary duty is one against self-dealing,
however, the nondisclosure argument is not a very powerful explanation for
insider trading liability. Persons subject to the disclose or abstain theory
often are also subject to a duty of confidentiality, which precludes them from
disclosing the information. As to them, the insider trading prohibition thus
becomes a rule to abstain from trading, rather than a rule requiring disclos-
ure or abstention. A former SEC Commissioner admits as much: "Unlike
much securities regulation, the insider trading rules probably do not result
in more information coming into the market: The 'abstain or disclose' rule
for those entrusted with confidential information usually is observed by
abstention. "59 In other words, given that defendant had no right to disclose,
it is the failure to abstain from trading, rather than the nondisclosure, which
is the basis for imposing liability. It is for this reason that the fiduciary duty
relevant to the disclose or abstain theory of liability is more accurately
described as a duty to refrain from self-dealing in confidential information
belonging to another than as a duty of confidentiality or disclosure.
6
0
Put another way, the nondisclosure argument is circular. As Chiarella
made clear, and Dirks affirmed, not all failures to disclose are fraudulent.
Rather, a nondisclosure is actionable only if the trader is subject to a duty to
disclose. In turn, I contend, a duty to disclose exists only where the trader
is subject to a fiduciary duty to refrain from self-dealing in confidential
information. Absent such a fiduciary duty, insider trading simply is not
fraudulent.61 Once again, this leaves the disclose or abstain rule subject to
the same line of attack as was adopted by the Bryan court.
59. Cox & Fogarty, supra note 36, at 353.
60. The Bryan court appears to have realized that the conduct traditionally viewed as
falling within the scope of the disclose or abstain theory of liability properly can be viewed
as a theft of information, albeit without recognizing the implications of that point for the
viability of the disclose or abstain theory. The court opined that "trading on the basis of mis-
appropriated information" would give rise to liability where "a corporate executive trades in
shares of his own company, without disclosure, on the basis of information entrusted to him
solely for corporate purposes." Bryan, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 15893, at *29. In other
words, liability arises where the executive, without disclosure, self-deals in confidential cor-
porate information.
61. It is for this reason that insider trading does not implicate the federal policy of pre-
venting fraud in securities transactions.
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A further problem with Bryan is that the statute's and the rule's texts in
fact provide little guidance as to the scope of insider trading liability. Ac-
cording to Central Bank, where the text does not resolve some aspect of the
Rule 10b-5 cause of action, courts must "infer 'how the 1934 Congress
would have addressed the issue had the 10b-5 action been included as an
express provision of the 1934 Act."'62 This presents the Court with what it
admits to be an "awkward task."63 Justice Scalia has put it somewhat more
colorfully: "We are imagining here."'  This process thus is known as
imaginative reconstruction of congressional intent.
Central Bank somewhat constrained the imaginative process by re-
quiring courts to "use the express causes of action in the securities acts as the
primary model for the § 10(b) action. "65 As applied to insider trading,
however, this approach is not especially helpful. The short-swing profits
cause of action under Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act regulates
insider trading only indirectly, does not seek to define insider trading, and
does not involve questions of fiduciary duty. Section 20A provides an ex-
press private right of action for insider trading, but was not adopted until
more than 50 years after Section 10(b) and, moreover, provides no sub-
stantive definition of insider trading. Section 21A creates a treble money
civil penalty for insider trading, but suffers from the same flaws as Section
20A insofar as it might be used as a source of imaginatively reconstructing
congressional intent with respect to Section 10(b).
Other evidence of congressional intent, however, suggests that Bryan's
extension of Central Bank to the insider trading context negates that intent.
The subject of congressional intent with respect to insider trading is
described below in considerable detail.66 It suffices here to note the follow-
ing points: There is good evidence that Congress in 1934 did not intend to
regulate insider trading in any way other than through the short-swing profit
provisions of Section 16(b). Since 1934, however, Congress has twice
62. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1448 (1994) (quoting
Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins., 113 S. Ct. 2773, 2090 (1993)). Although the
court in Central Bank concluded that the text was dispositive, it nonetheless went on to
consider how the 1934 Congress would have addressed the issue. Id. Considering congres-
sional intent as it relates to insider trading regulation thus would be appropriate, even if one
rejects the arguments made in the text as to the text's lack of clarity.
63. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 357
(1991).
64. Id. at 360.
65. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1448.
66. See infra part VI.A.1.
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amended the Act insofar as it relates to insider trading. Although the
legislative history of both provisions expressly left the definitional problem
to the courts, Congress on both occasions also expressly endorsed the
misappropriation theory.
Under the so-called re-enactment doctrine, the courts will adhere to a
judicial construction of a statute prevailing at the time Congress re-enacts
the statute.67 As argued below' 8 the misappropriation theory thus appears
to have been validated by congressional action. At least insofar as the re-
enactment doctrine applies to cases arising under Rule 10b-5, however, Cen-
tral Bank places it in serious jeopardy. The Central Bank majority remarked
that arguments based on the re-enactment doctrine "deserve little weight in
the interpretive process. "69 The Court also held that because "Congress has
not reenacted the language of § 10(b) since 1934" the Court need not
"determine whether the other conditions for applying the reenactment
doctrine are present. "70 Hence, even if Congress had intended that the 1984
and 1988 amendments expressly endorse the misappropriation theory, that
action arguably would not be binding on the courts.
Extension of this aspect of Central Bank to the insider trading context
would be just as flawed as Bryan's extension of its main holding. Rejecting
the re-enactment doctrine as authority for the misappropriation theory simply
because Section 10(b) has never been re-enacted ignores highly relevant
congressional action elsewhere in the act and thus flouts the apparent
congressional intent. If only the intent of the 1934 Congress is relevant,
after all, the evidence suggests that Section 10(b) was not concerned with
insider trading and the prohibition as a whole should be overturned. This
would negate the subsequently adopted statutory penalties for insider trading
because there no longer would be any underlying violation to which they
could be applied, which is an anomalous result, at best. Even if the disclose
or abstain theory survives Bryan, it still seems odd that penalties Congress
adopted with the clear intent that they be applied to misappropriation of
information should be rendered nugatory by the Fourth Circuit's rejection
of the underlying cause of action. As I argue in Part VI.A. 1 below in more
detail, this anomaly is best avoided by treating Congress's failure to define
insider trading as an invitation to the courts to develop such a definition
through an on-going process of common-law adjudication.
67. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1452.
68. See infra part VI.A.1.
69. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1452.
70. Id.
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Finally, Bryan's approach to interpreting Rule lOb-5 precludes one
from taking into account the policy considerations developed in Part VI
below.7 To be sure, Central Bank opined that policy considerations may not
override the court's interpretation of the text and structure of the Act.'
There is an emerging school of thought, however, that Central Bank is
merely one in a series of recent decisions in which the Court's interpretation
of the Act's text and structure were driven by an overriding policy concern:
namely, reducing the number of securities lawsuits.73 More charitably, we
might refer to this as a desire to prevent excessive, vexatious, often frivolous
securities litigation. If so, it is a project with which I generally have con-
siderable sympathy.74 In this instance, however, I believe the policy justifi-
71. Although the Bryan court recognized that Central Bank purportedly discourages
recourse to policy considerations, it did consider certain policy arguments against the
misappropriation theory. Chief among them were the anomalies inherent in the misappropri-
ation theory, see United States v. Bryan, No. 94-5124, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 15893, at
*51-59 (4th Cir. June 27, 1995), which are described in detail in Part VI.A.2.b.iii. The
Bryan court ignored the possibility that these anomalies can be explained in a way that is
consistent with a sound public policy towards insider trading. I develop such an explanation
in Part VI.B.2 below.
72. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1453-54. The Court made an exception for cases in
which policy considerations "show that adherence to the text and structure would lead to a
result 'so bizarre' that Congress could not have intended it." Id. at 1454. As argued above,
insider trading becomes just such a case when the post-1934 congressional enactments are
taken into account.
73. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Securities Act Section 12(2) After the Gustafson
Debacle, __ Bus. LAw. _ (forthcoming 1995).
74. Id. A word should be said to distinguish my critique of the Supreme Court's
decision in Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct. 1061 (1995), from the argument being made
here. In Gustafson, the Supreme Court substantially restricted the scope of liability under
Securities Act § 12(2). In many respects, § 12(2) offers plaintiffs a more attractive remedy
than does Rule lob-5. If the Supreme Court had not restricted the class of transactions to
which § 12(2) liability attaches, § 12(2) might well have displaced Rule lob-5 as the principal
vehicle for imposition of securities liability. Some commentators have argued that the
Supreme Court could appropriately take into account the effect a broad interpretation of
§ 12(2) would have on Rule lob-5 in the course of interpreting the former. See Bainbridge,
supra note 73. This is too pragmatic an approach to statutory interpretation for my tastes.
In this regard, I invoked the homely adage that "two wrongs don't make a right," to argue
that the Supreme Court's institutionally illegitimate creation of the implied right of action
should not be used to thereafter justify an incorrect interpretation of an express statutory right
of action. Id. at n. 120.
My current argument is not an attempt to "have my cake and eat it too." My argument
against Gustafson is only that the cart should not be put before the horse: The mere fact that
the Rule lOb-5 cause of action is on the books and, Central Bank notwithstanding, is likely
to remain there for the foreseeable future should not control the interpretation of an express
statutory provision. In contrast, the present context involves the quite different question of
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cations developed below for retaining the federal insider trading prohibition
and treating it as a species of federal common law outweigh the policy
arguments for piecemeal cutbacks on the scope of Rule lOb-5.
In sum, if congressional intent is to be imaginatively reconstructed, one
should conclude that the securities statutes instruct courts to treat the prob-
lem of defining insider trading as a common-law question.75 To be clear, my
point is not that the definition of insider trading is federal common law. I
acknowledge that the long tradition of so viewing the prohibition has been
called into doubt by Central Bank. My point is only that the analytical
methodologies applied by the Supreme Court to federal common-law issues
provide an appropriate mechanism for giving content to the federal pro-
hibition. This approach is consistent with the Supreme Court's lOb-5 juris-
prudence, arguably even post-Central Bank, and also with both the most
sensible reconstruction of congressional intent and sound public policy.
Once the problem is seen as one to be solved by application of federal
common law, a choice of law question arises. Federal common law often
is influenced by, and not infrequently incorporates, state law. In Burks v.
Lasker,76 for example, a shareholder of a federally regulated investment
company brought suit under the federal securities laws against the company's
board of directors. The Supreme Court held that state law controls the board
of directors' ability to use a special litigation committee to terminate
the litigation. 7 In Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc. ,8 the Court
extended Burks, describing the federal law governing derivative suits
brought under the Investment Company Act as a species of federal common
law, and incorporating state law governing excusal of the demand require-
ment in such suits.79 Until quite recently, for another example, the federal
courts applied state statutes of limitation to private party lawsuits under Rule
1Ob-5. ° Although the Supreme Court adopted a unique federal limitations
period in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, the Court
how courts should interpret the Rule 10b-5 cause of action itself. Notwithstanding my doubts
about the legitimacy of the creation of implied private rights of action, fuller explication of
which is perhaps best left for another day, unless and until the Court overturns the Rule lob-5
cause of action, it remains on the books and must be interpreted.
75. See infra part VI.A.1.
76. 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
77. Burks v. Laser, 441 U.S. 471, 486 (1979).
78. 500 U.S. 90 (1991).
79. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., 500 U.S. 90, 108 (1991).
80. See Liampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 354
n.1 (1991) (citing cases).
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indicated that it would continue to borrow state statutes of limitations in
appropriate cases."
In light of these precedents, the question is not whether state law is
relevant to the task of defining insider trading, but rather the extent to which
it should be incorporated into the federal prohibition. In particular, the
question at hand is the extent to which state law fiduciary duty concepts
should be incorporated into the fiduciary duty requirement established by
Chiarella. In answering that question, courts have two options.' First, they
may create a unique rule of federal common law that applies uniformly
throughout the nation.83 The courts could draw on state law by analogy in
doing so, but the rule would remain wholly federal. Second, they may adopt
state law as the federal rule. If this option is selected, the substantive con-
tent of the federal rule will vary depending on which state's law controls.'
Yet again, this is a question the Supreme Court failed to answer with
clarity. On the one hand, the Dirks Court contended "that '[a] significant
purpose of the Exchange Act was to eliminate the idea that use of inside
information for personal advantage was a normal emolument of corporate
office.' ""5 If so, one would assume that the fiduciary duty arises out of
federal law. 86 As we shall see, however, this contention is at best an over-
statement. 87
On the other hand, the Dirks Court also implied that the requisite duty
arose out of state common law:
81. Id. at 355-58. To be sure, while both of these examples involve the use of state
common law to fill 'the interstices of the federal securities laws, and thus suggest that state law
could appropriately play a role in insider trading prohibition as well, neither directly
addresses the use of state common law to define the elements of a federal claim. This too is
possible, however. In DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956), for example, the court
looked to the state law definition of "children" for purposes of interpreting a federal statute.
82. See PETER W. Low & JOHN CALViN JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 296-97 (1987).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 297.
85. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653 n.10 (1983) (citing In re Cady, Roberts & Co.,
40 S.E.C. 907, 912 n.15 (1961)).
86. The Court's repeated references to a "Cady, Roberts duty" may also point towards
a federal source for the requisite duty. There is at least the implication that Cady, Roberts cre-
ated a federal duty to refrain from self-dealing in confidential information, which has become
part of the overall bundle of fiduciary duties to which insiders are subject. See, e.g., id. at
662. This analysis, however, suffers from two flaws. First, it reads an awful lot into some
vague passages of both Dirks and Cady, Roberts. Second, creation of such a duty is incon-
sistent with the Court's holding in Santa Fe. See infra notes 288-97 and accompanying text.
87. See infra part VI.A. 1.
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In the seminal case of In re Cady, Roberts & Co., the SEC recog-
nized that the common law in some jurisdictions imposes on "corporate
'insiders,' particularly officers, directors, or controlling shareholders" an
"affirmative duty of disclosure... when dealing in securities." The SEC
found that .. .breach of this common law duty also establish[ed] the
elements of a Rule lOb-5 violation...."
In other words, the federal securities laws are violated only upon breach of
this purported state common-law duty. This interpretation of Dirks also
would seem to be supported by the misappropriation theory: The focus in
most misappropriation cases is on violation of duties arising out of the em-
ployment relationship, which in turn implicates agency law and thus points
towards a state law source for the requisite duty.
The lower courts have likewise failed to resolve this question, although
cases consistent with both approaches exist. The Second Circuit's Chestman
decision, for example, is compatible with the unique federal rule approach.89
The court considered whether a spousal relationship constituted a fiduciary
relationship triggering Chiarella. It undertook a careful and exhaustive
analysis, which is wholly irrelevant to the problem at hand, because the
court failed to resolve the choice of law issue. Instead, the court created a
generic fiduciary duty, which purports to take its "cues as to what is required
88. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 653.
89. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1759 (1992); see also United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (drawing
on state law fiduciary principles, as well as federal precedents, to determine whether familial
relationship met fiduciary duty requirement); Pengra, supra note 5, at 1372-74 (urging courts
to adopt federal fiduciary standard); cf. Douglas M. Branson, Discourse on the Supreme
CourtApproach to SEC Rule 10b-5 and Insider Trading, 30 EMORY L.J. 263, 277-78 (1981)
(noting Chiarella may have federalized "the most advanced state the common law had reached
in a handful of jurisdictions"). Professor Langevoort points out that an early line of cases
created "an established principle of federal law under rule 10b-5 that insiders owe a fiduciary
duty of disclosure when engaged in face-to-face purchases or sales with corporate
shareholders." DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING REGULATION 37 (1988). True
enough, see infra note 129 (citing cases that applied special circumstances and fiduciary duty
rules to face-to-face insider trading transactions), but these cases antedate not only Chiarella,
but also Santa Fe. Moreover, they deal with face-to-face and control transactions, not
secondary market transactions. See infra note 297. As we shall see, there is plenty of prece-
dent from state common law for treating the latter differently. See infra part V.C. As such,
the existence of this line of cases does not compel one to conclude that the duty in question
is a federal one. To the contrary, the underlying rationale of this line of cases is contrary to
Chiarella and Dirks. These cases impose liability on insiders to effect a purported congres-
sional intent to assure equality of access to information. See, e.g., Cook v. Avien, Inc., 573
F.2d 685, 694 n.19 (1st Cir. 1978). As we have seen, however, Chiarella and Dirks rejected
the equal access policy as a basis for imposing insider trading liability. See supra part II.A.
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to create the requisite relationship from the securities fraud precedents and
the common law. "I In so doing, the court relied extensively on state law
fiduciary duty concepts." At the same time, however, the court gave not
even a hint that state law was controlling. As such, under a Chestman-like
approach, state law arguments are at most relevant but not dispositive. 2
90. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 568:
91. See id. at 568-70. A student commentator suggests that In re Worlds of Wonder
Sec. Litig., [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,689 (N.D. Cal.
1990), implicitly assumes that the fiduciary duty in question arises out of federal law. See
Pengra, supra note 5, at 1373. Worlds of Wonder involved a private cause of action brought
by holders of convertible debentures against insiders who had allegedly inside traded in the
corporation's stock. The court recognized that Chiarella required it to find a fiduciary
relationship between the debentureholders and the insiders. Worlds of Wonder, [1990-1991
Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCII) at 98,239. Analogizing convertible debentures
to equity securities, the court found that the requisite duty existed in this context. Id. This
conclusion is contrary to the vast majority of state law decisions, which decline to recognize
fiduciary duties running to holders of convertible bonds. See, e.g., Simons v. Cogan, 549
A.2d 300 (Del. 1988); see also Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981) (any fiduciary duties running to holders of convertible bonds
would be satisfied because insiders complied with terms of bond indenture). In view of the
overwhelming mass of contrary state authority and the Worlds of Wonder court's failure to
take cognizance of that body of precedent, the opinion is perhaps best read as yet another
example of a judicial failure to recognize the problem at hand.
92. Some cases have reached results clearly in conflict with applicable state law. In
SEC v. Lund, 570 F. Supp. 1397 (C.D. Cal. 1983), for example, Lund and another
businessman discussed a proposed joint venture between their respective companies. In those
discussions, Lund received confidential information about the other's firm. Lund thereafter
bought stock in the other's company. The court determined that by virtue of their close
personal and professional relationship, and because of the business context of the discussion,
Lund was a constructive insider of the issuer. Lund, 570 F. Supp. at 1401-03. In doing so,
however, the court focused almost solely on the issuer's expectation of confidentiality. It
failed to inquire into whether Lund had agreed to keep the information confidential. See
LANGEVOORT, supra note 89, at 92-94.
Lund is inconsistent with the leading state law decision. In Walton v. Morgan Stanley
& Co., 623 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1980), Morgan Stanley represented a company considering
acquiring Olinkraft Corporation in a friendly merger. During exploratory negotiations
Olinkraft gave Morgan confidential information. Morgan's client ultimately decided not to
pursue the merger, but Morgan allegedly later passed the acquired information to another
client planning a tender offer for Olinkraft. In addition, Morgan's arbitrage department made
purchases of Olinkraft stock for its own account. The Second Circuit held that Morgan was
not a fiduciary of Olinkraft: "Put bluntly, although, according to the complaint, Olinkraft's
management placed its confidence in Morgan Stanley not to disclose the information, Morgan
owed no duty to observe that confidence." Walton, 623 F.2d at 799.
Interestingly, a subsequent case from the same district as Lund affirmed the need for an
affirmative assumption of the duty of confidentiality. See SEC v. Ingram, [1987-1988 Trans-
fer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,788 (C.D. Cal. 1988). In none of this, however,
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In contrast, if the latter option is selected, state law fiduciary duty
concepts would be determinative. While insider trading would remain a
matter of federal law, the substantive definition of insider trading would be
supplied by state law. Several cases appear to be consistent with this
approach. In United States v. Carpenter, for example, the court held that:
[B]ecause of [Winans's] duty of confidentiality to the Journal, defendants
... [had a] corollary duty, which they breached, under section 10(b) and
rle 10b-5, to abstain from trading in securities on the basis of misappro-
priated information or to do so only upon making adequate disclosure to
those with whom they traded.93
Put another way, Winans's federal duty to disclose arose under Section 10(b)
only because he first violated his state law duty to the Wall Street Journal.
Similarly, albeit in a noninsider trading case, the Seventh Circuit interpreted
Dirks as holding that "the existence of a requirement to speak [under Rule
lOb-5] ... is itself based on state law.. .. ,94
How then should courts choose between these options? Unfortunately,
the standards governing that choice are not particularly well-developed. The
basic test, however, is the impact incorporation of state law would have on
the relevant federal statutory policies. In Lampf, for example, the Court
created a unique federal statute of limitations for implied federal rights of
action because borrowing a state limitations rule would frustrate the purpose
of the underlying federal statute.95 In Burks, the Court used state law to fill
the interstices of a federal statute affecting the powers of directors because
doing so did not permit acts prohibited by the federal statute and was other-
wise not inconsistent with the statutory policy.' In Kamen v. Kemper Finan-
cial Services, Inc. ,' the Court reaffirmed what it termed "the basic teaching
of Burks v. Lasker: Where a gap in the federal securities laws must be
bridged by a rule that bears on the allocation of governing powers within the
corporation, federal courts should incorporate state law into federal common
law unless the particular state law in question is inconsistent with the policies
did the respective roles of state and federal law receive the attention they merit.
93. United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1034 (2d Cir. 1986), aft'd, 484 U.S.
19 (1987).
94. Jordan v. Duff& Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 436 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed,
485 U.S. 901 (1988).
95. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 356
(1991).
96. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 479 (1979).
97. 500 U.S. 90 (1991).
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underlying the federal statute." 98 The bottom line then is whether there are
important federal interests that would be adversely affected by adopting state
law fiduciary duty principles as the federal rule of decision. 9
V. The Impact of Incorporation
In light of the preceding analysis, the first inquiry must be into the im-
pact incorporation of state fiduciary duties would have on the federal insider
trading prohibition. If state law is borrowed as the rule of decision, the
federal prohibition will become little more than an empty shell waiting to be
filled by state law fiduciary duties. Logically, the first inquiry in any insider
trading case thus would be whether the defendant's conduct is proscribed by
state law. If so, defendant's trades violate the federal prohibition, but if not,
the trades do not violate the federal prohibition. This Part outlines the
methodology such an inquiry would demand by examining three fiduciary
relationships: corporate insiders to bondholders, outside corporate counsel
to their clients, and corporate insiders to their corporation and their share-
holders.
To be sure, an inquiry of the sort illustrated here is essentially unheard
of in federal insider trading jurisprudence. The Supreme Court itself set the
tone in Dirks. At best, the common-law duty to which Justice Powell
pointed exists only in "some jurisdictions."" With no analysis or citation
of authority, however, Powell extrapolated from this common-law duty the
98. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 108 (1991).
99. This interpretation is consistent with the test laid out in the leading case of United
States v. Kimball Foods, 440 U.S. 715 (1979), in which the Supreme Court laid out the fol-
lowing criteria for deciding when state law should be incorporated into federal common-law
rules:
Undoubtedly, federal programs that "by their nature are and must be uniform
in character throughout the nation" necessitate formulation of controlling federal
rules. Conversely, when there is little need for a nationally uniform body of law,
state law may be incorporated as the federal rule of decision. Apart from
considerations of uniformity, we must also determine whether application of state
law would frustrate specific objectives of the federal programs. If so, we must
fashion special rules solicitous of those federal interests. Finally, our choice-of-
law inquiry must consider the extent to which application of a federal rule would
disrupt commercial relationships predicated on state law.
Kimball Foods, 440 U.S. at 728-29. To be sure, Kimball Foods is not squarely on point
because the occasion for creating federal common law arose in that case because the United
States was a party to the litigation rather than because the claim arose under federal law. It
does confirm, however, the importance of determining whether incorporating state law would
adversely affect some federal policy.
100. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659 (1983); see generally infra part V.C.
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rule that all "insiders [are] forbidden by their fiduciary relationship from
personally using undisclosed corporate information to their advantage." 01
In effect, Justice Powell and virtually every subsequent lower court'decision
implicitly assumed that there is a single set of fiduciary duties, found in all
fiduciary relationships, which always includes a duty to refrain from self-
dealing in nonpublic information belonging to another. 102
There are two problems with this assumption. The less important of the
two is that it collapses the inquiry into the single question of whether inside
traders have a fiduciary relationship with someone affected by their trades.
As we have seen, however, the analysis cannot end there. One must go on
to ask whether there has been a breach of the requisite duty.
The more important of the two problems is that the assumption is
simply not true as a matter of state common law. Different types of fiduci-
ary relationships impose different types of fiduciary duties. Different states
impose different fiduciary duties on the same relationship. As a result, not
all fiduciary relationships include a duty to refrain from self-dealing in
nonpublic information belonging to another. If the federal prohibition must
rely on state law fiduciary duty concepts, prosecuting insider trading thus
becomes much more complex than it is under the current approach. Indeed,
as we shall see, in many cases reliance on state law will free some potential
defendants from liability. The impact of incorporation on the federal
prohibition thus will be substantial.
A. Insiders and Bondholders
If insider trading liability under the disclose or abstain rule indeed
requires a fiduciary relationship arising out of state law, then one may use
material, nonpublic information with impunity when trading in debt securi-
ties. '3 In virtually all jurisdictions, corporate officers and directors owe no
101. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659.
102. Justice Powell's treatment of this problem is especially frustrating in light of the
lower court's handling of the issue. In the court of appeals, Dirks contended that his
informants breached no fiduciary duty under applicable- state law. The court of appeals
questioned whether that was correct, but assumed it to be the case for purposes of reviewing
the SEC's decision. Dir& v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 463 U.S. 646
(1983). The court of appeals nevertheless rejected Dirks's argument, asserting that Chiarella
"did not hold that breach of the [insiders'] fiduciary obligations was required to bring rule
10b-5 to bear on the case, nor did it hold that state fiduciary law was the sole source of the
duty to disclose-or-refrain." Id. at 838-39. Unfortunately, in reversing the first half of that
statement, Justice Powell simply ignored the second half.
103. Various alternative theories of liability may come into play in this context. In
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fiduciary duties to bondholders. Instead, the bondholders' rights are limited
to the express terms of the contract and an implied covenant of good faith. 104
Cases in a few jurisdictions purport to recognize fiduciary duties running to
holders of debt securities, but the duties imposed in these cases usually are
more accurately characterized as the very same implied covenant of good
faith found in most other jurisdictions. 05
particular, the misappropriation theory might apply. Suppose a corporate officer traded in
the firm's debt securities using material nonpublic information belonging to the corporation.
As the argument would go, even though the officer owes no fiduciary duties to the bond-
holders, he owes fiduciary duties to the corporation. The violation of those duties would
suffice for liability under the misappropriation theory. See Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note
5, at 242-45. One trouble with this argument is that it assumes that the officer owes duties
to the corporation that are violated by insider trading. Such an assumption may not be war-
ranted. See infra part V.C. In any case, the misappropriation theory would not reach trading
by an issuer in its own debt securities, which would come under the disclose or abstain rule.
Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 5, at 245.
104. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504
(S.D.N.Y. 1989); Katz v. Oak Indus., 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986).
105. See, e.g., Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 965 (1981); Gardner & Florence Call Cowles Found. v. Empire, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 669
(S.D.N.Y. 1984), vacated, 754 F.2d 478 (2d Cir, 1985); Fox v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc.,
187 Cal. Rptr. 141 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982). A student commentator recently argued that a
fiduciary duty running to bondholders should be recognized under Rule 10b-5. See Pengra,
supra note 5, at 1374-77. Setting aside for the moment the commentator's questionable argu-
ment for federalizing these fiduciary duties, the argument for creating fiduciary duties -
federal or state - running to bondholders is extremely weak. Bond issuances are repeat
transactions. Where parties expect to have repeated transactions, the risk of self-dealing by
one party is constrained by the threat that the other party will punish the cheating party in
future transactions. The issuer's management has a strong self-interest in the corporation's
cost of capital (i.e., avoiding takeovers, maximizing personal wealth, avoiding firm failure).
Management therefore will be slow to do anything that unnecessarily increases their cost of
capital. But if they abuse their current bondholders, that will come back to haunt them the
next time they want to use the bond market to raise capital. If investors care about protection
from insider trading, management therefore will provide it.
In addition, negotiations between the issuer and the underwriters that market the debt
securities will produce efficient levels of protection. Because the bond market is dominated
by a small number of institutional investors, the relationship between underwriters and bond-
holders is another example of the repeat transaction phenomenon. Underwriters will not sully
their reputations with bondholders for the sake of one issuer. Moreover, in a firm commit-
ment underwriting, the underwriters buy the securities from the issuer. If the indenture does
not provide adequate levels of protection, the underwriters will be unable to sell the bonds.
Finally, if the risk of insider trading is unsystematic in nature, portfolio theory suggests
that bondholders can eliminate it by holding a diversified portfolio. Even if insider trading
is characterized as a systematic risk, the bond market is dominated by highly sophisticated
institutions, which are fully capable of pricing the bonds in light of the indenture's terms.
As such, the pricing mechanism (assuming the market to be efficient) will provide a rate of
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The distinction between this implied covenant and a fiduciary duty is an
important one for our purposes. An implied covenant of good faith arises
from the express terms of a contract and is used to fulfill the parties' mutual
intent." 6 In contrast, a fiduciary duty has little to do with the parties' intent.
Instead, courts use fiduciary duties to protect the interests of the duty's bene-
ficiary. In other words, while a fiduciary duty requires the party subject to
the duty to put the interests of the beneficiary of the duty ahead of his own,
an implied duty of good faith merely requires him to respect their bargain.
A two-step move thus will be required if lower courts are to impose
liability under the disclose or abstain rule on those who inside trade in debt
securities. First, the clear holdings of Chiarella and Dirks must be set aside
so that the requisite relationship can be expanded to include purely
contractual arrangements and the requisite duty expanded to include mere
contractual covenants. Second, the implied covenant of good faith must be
interpreted as barring self-dealing in nonpublic information by corporate
agents.
The first move raises serious institutional legitimacy concerns. In
Chiarella, a majority of the justices indicated varying degrees of receptivity
to the misappropriation theory. One might therefore argue that the lower
courts' creation of the misappropriation theory was institutionally justifiable
because they did so at the apparent invitation of the Supreme Court. But the
Court has never invited lower courts to eliminate altogether the fiduciary
duty requirement.
The second move is equally problematic. Even assuming that the im-
plied covenant of good faith controls the conduct of corporate agents, the
covenant should not be deemed to bar self-dealing in nonpublic information.
The leading Met Life decision indicates that a covenant of good faith will be
implied only when necessary to ensure that neither side deprives the other
side of the fruits of the agreement."7 The fruits of the agreement are limited
to regular payment of interest and ultimate repayment of principal.' Be-
cause insider trading rarely will affect either of these fruits, the covenant
does not preclude it.
Delaware Chancellor Allen set out a more expansive standard in Oak
Industries, which held that an implied covenant of good faith is always
interest that compensates the bondholders for any insider trading.
106. Katz v. Oak Indus., 508 A.2d 873, 880 (Del. Ch. 1986).
107. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1517
(S.D.N.Y. 1989).
108. Id. at 1518.
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present in corporate debt relationships. " This implied covenant is breached
when it is clear from the express terms of the indenture trust that the parties
would have prohibited the challenged act had they thought to negotiate about
it."' Allen's standard is thus a bit broader, seemingly extending the cov-
enant to conduct that does not directly threaten either the repayment of
principal or regular payment of interest. In particular, Allen's analysis
allows the implied covenant of good faith to address matters that affect the
market price of the bonds. This requires, however, that there be express
terms addressing such matters because only then could one draw the
necessary inference that the parties would have proscribed the conduct in
question had they bargained over the issue. Given the increasingly bare
bones nature of indenture trust agreements, it seems unlikely that the
language necessary for the covenant to bar insider trading by corporate
officers will be present in very many cases.
In sum, the disclose or abstain rule should not apply to insider trading
in debt securities. The requisite breach of duty by definition cannot be found
because there simply is no fiduciary relationship between the corporation's
agents and its bondholders.
B. Corporate Counsel
The Second Circuit treats the attorney-client relationship as a "horn-
book" fiduciary relationship."' Not surprisingly, lawyers that trade on
confidential client information routinely incur insider trading liability
without any meaningful analysis of whether their conduct violated their
fiduciary duties." 2 As I have argued elsewhere, however, one can construct
109. Katz, 508 A.2d at 879-80.
110. Id. at 880.
111. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 568 (2d Cir. 1991) (dictum), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992).
112. See, e.g., SEC v. Singer, 786 F. Supp. 1158 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); United States v.
Elliott, 711 F. Supp. 425 (N.D. Ill. 1989); see also SEC v. Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (law firm support staff held liable without evidence that..ey were subject
to requisite fiduciary duty).
Professionals other than lawyers also have been subjected to liability without serious
analysis. In United States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), the court deter-
mined that a psychiatrist violated the prohibition by trading on information learned from a
patient. In determining that the requisite breach of fiduciary duty had occurred, the court
relied in large measure on the Hippocratic Oath. In relevant part, the Oath reads: "Whatso-
ever things I see or hear concerning the life of men, in my attendance on the sick or even
apart therefrom, which ought not to be noised abroad, I will keep silence thereon, counting
such things to be as sacred secrets." Id. at 272. While the Oath thus imposes a duty of
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a perfectly plausible argument that insider trading by lawyers does not
violate their fiduciary duties to their clients."'
To make a long argument as concise as possible, let us assume that a
lawyer's state law fiduciary obligations with respect to confidential client
information are accurately stated by the American Law Institute's Restate-
ment of the Law Governing Lawyers. Unless the client expressly forbids
self-dealing in confidential client information, insider trading violates the
Restatement's standard only if harm to the client results or is reasonably
likely to result from the lawyer's trading activity."' Because insider trading
often neither harms nor even threatens to harm clients, it frequently will be
permitted by the Restatement's provisions on client confidentiality." 5
Indeed, the drafters admit as much, offering the following illustration:
Lawyer represents Client, a multi-national corporation whose stock is
traded on several national stock exchanges. In an otherwise legal transaction,
Lawyer makes a $5,000 purchase of Client's stock as a personal investment.
In part, Lawyer is motivated by a favorable impression of Client's manage-
ment. Lawyer's impression is based in part on confidential client information
that Lawyer has gained through the course of representing Client.116
For those of us trained as securities lawyers, this seems like a classic case
of insider trading for which Lawyer should expect both securities law and
disciplinary sanctions. The drafters, however, conclude that "Lawyer's use
of the confidential client information does not violate" the rules regulating
confidential client information.
11 7
In view of this analysis, Lawyer also has not violated the federal insider
trading prohibition. Because the law governing lawyers fails to proscribe
Lawyer's trading, the requisite breach of fiduciary duty simply is not
present.1 Once again, reliance on state law fiduciary duty concepts thus
confidentiality on those who take it, it does not forbid them from self-dealing in information
learned from patients so long as the information is not thereby disclosed.
113. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Under the Restatement of the Law Govern-
ing Lawyers, 19 J. CORP. L. 1 (1993).
114. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAw GOVERNING LAWYERs § 111 (Tentative
Draft No. 3, 1990).
115. Bainbridge, supra note 113, at 8-16.
116. RESTATEMENT, supra note 114, at § 111 illus. 2.
117. Id.
118. Again, one might fall back on the misappropriation theory as a source of liability.
In its classic form, the misappropriation theory was intended to capture cases in which the
insider traded in the securities of a corporation with whom he had no fiduciary relationship.
If a lawyer representing the bidder in an acquisition bought target stock, for example, the
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precludes federal prosecution.
C. Corporate Officers and Directors
If there is any one group that everyone, excepting only a few academic
opponents of the prohibition, agrees ought to be captured by the insider
trading prohibition, it is surely true insiders - corporate directors and senior
managers. Yet, recall the move that Justice Powell was obliged to make in
Dirks. He simply asserted that the fiduciary duties of all corporate insiders
forbid them from self-dealing in nonpublic information belonging to the cor-
poration. The sole basis for this assertion ever mentioned in the opinion is
the SEC's Cady, Roberts decision, which in turn was supported only by a
purported common-law duty found in "some jurisdictions." "9 Given the
importance Dirks lays on the fiduciary duty element, Justice Powell's failure
to provide any meaningful analysis or justification of this alleged rule is dis-
turbing at best. In fact, on close examination, his reliance on Cady, Roberts
disclose or abstain rule would not apply because the lawyer owes no fiduciary duties to the
non-client target or its shareholders, but the misappropriation theory would apply. See, e.g.,
United States v. Elliott, 711 F. Supp. 425 (N.D. Ill. 1989); see also SEC v. Singer, 786 F.
Supp. 1158 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (lawyer used confidential client information to trade in stock
of non-client corporation). The misappropriation theory, however, readily can be extended
to cases in which the lawyer traded in the client's stock. See, e.g., United States v. Teicher,
987 F.2d 112, 117 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 467 (1993) (investment bank
employee charged with misappropriating information relating to client's forthcoming merger).
The sticking point, however, remains the requirement of a breach of fiduciary duty.
Here we might usefully distinguish between solo practitioners and members of a law firm.
In the former case, it will be necessary to show that the lawyer owed a fiduciary duty to the
client. This will require a constructive insider analysis similar to that used under the disclose
or abstain rule. As such, the solo practitioner can plausibly argue that his use of confidential
client information did not breach any fiduciary duty. In the more common and important case
of a lawyer working within a law firm, the logic of the misappropriation theory suggests that
liability could be imposed even if the law firm owed no relevant fiduciary duty to the client,
and thus would itself be free to trade, so long as the trading lawyer owes fiduciary duties to
the law firm. Many law firms now subject their employees to explicit contractual obligations
to refrain from trading in client stock. MARC I. STEINBERG, CORPORATE AND SECURITIES
MALPRACTICE 93-94 (1992). At least one court has imposed liability under the misappropri-
ation theory for violation of such a contractually based duty. United States v. Carpenter, 791
F.2d 1024, 1033-34 (2d Cir. 1986), aft'd on other grounds, 484 U.S. 19 (1987) (newspaper
policy sufficed to impose liability on employee). This approach, however, creates the same
institutional competence problems associated with extending insider trading liability to trading
in debt securities. Alternatively, one might look to agency law to find the requisite fiduciary
duty. This too is problematic, however, because one can make a plausible argument that
insider trading is not a violation of the agent's fiduciary duty to the principal. See infra notes
154-58 and accompanying text.
119. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653 (1983).
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and the supposed common-law duty proves an unusually thin rope upon
which to hang the draconian penalties for violating the federal insider trading
prohibition.
Consider first the fiduciary duty required for liability under the disclose
or abstain rule. Are officers and directors subject to a fiduciary duty run-
ning to shareholders to refrain from self-dealing in nonpublic information
belonging to the corporation? As a matter of state law, the answer is far
from clear.
State common-law insider trading rules saw their most active -period of
development during the first three decades of this century. During that
period three approaches to the insider trading problem emerged: The insider
had no duty to refrain from self-dealing in nonpublic information belonging
to the firm and thus could buy freely regardless of any informational advan-
tage; the insider had no duty in the absence of "special circumstances" or
"special facts" justifying the imposition of a duty; or the insider had a
fiduciary duty to the shareholders and was required either to disclose any
relevant inside information or to forgo trading.'2°
Prior to 1890 it was treatise law that "[t]he doctrine that officers and
directors are trustees of the stockholders... does not extend to their private
dealings with stockholders or others, though in such dealings they take
advantage of knowledge gained through their official position. "121 Because
liability in such transactions could arise only from actual fraud, the disposi-
tive question was whether the defendant said or did anything "to divert or
prevent, and which did divert or prevent, the plaintiff from looking into, or
making inquiry, or further inquiries, as to the affairs or condition of the
company and its prospects for dividends."'2
120. See generally Adolf Berle, Publicity of Accounts and Directors' Purchases of Stock,
25 MICH. L. REv. 827 (1927); Beverly Lake, The Use for Personal Profit of Knowledge
Gained Wile a Director, 9 Miss. L.J 427 (1937); Clarence D. Laylin, The Duty of a Direc-
tor Purchasing Shares of Stock, 27 YALE L.J. 731 (1918); Harold R. Smith, Purchase of
Shares of a Corporation by a Directorfrom a Shareholder, 19 MICH. L. REV. 698 (1921);
Robert Walker, The Duty of Disclosure by a Director Purchasing Stock from His Stockhold-
ers, 32 YALE L.J. 637 (1923); H.L. Wilgus, Purchase of Shares of a Corporation by a
Directorfrom a Shareholder, 8 MICH. L. REV. 267 (1910). For a careful examination of the
state common-law rules, which concludes that state courts were striving throughout the
relevant time period to find ways of sanctioning insider trading, see Douglas M. Branson,
Choosing the Appropriate Default Rule - Insider Trading Under State Law, _ ALA. L. RV.
(forthcoming).
121. Wilgus, supra note 120, at 267 (quoting 21 THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAw 898 (2d ed.' 1902)).
122. Carpenter v. Danforth, 52 Barb. 581, 589 (N.Y. App. Div. 1868); Wilgus, supra note
120, at 272-74 (discussing Carpenter); see also Grant v. Attrill, 11 F. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1882)
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After 1900, some courts continued to reject any fiduciary duty on the
part of corporate officers and directors in their private dealings with share-
holders,"u but the trend was towards the special circumstances rule and, to
a lesser extent, the fiduciary duty rule. Although the former would prove
more widely accepted than the latter, it was the latter that was first adopted
by the courts. In 1903, for example, the Georgia Supreme Court adopted
a fiduciary duty rule, holding that " [w]here the director obtains the informa-
tion giving added value to the stock by virtue of his official position, he
holds the information in trust for the benefit of [the shareholders]." 24 Simi-
larly, in 1904, the Kansas Supreme Court approved the notion that a director
had a duty to all shareholders to disclose material information about the
corporation. 5s
In 1909, the United States Supreme Court introduced the special cir-
cumstances rule in Strong v. Repide. " In Strong, a director purchased
shares from a stockholder at less than one-tenth of their potential value. In
doing so, the director concealed both his identity and the imminent
announcement of a profitable contract. The Court held that under such
(holding that sale of stock induced by levy of assessment was not so tainted with fraud as to
render it void); Board of Comm'rs v. Reynolds, 44 Ind. 509 (1873) (holding over strong dissent
that there was no trustee relationship because directors did not have control, power, or dominion
over shares); Crowell v. Jackson, 23 A. 426 (N.J. 1891) (liability only for active misrepresen-
tation, no general duty of disclosure); Krumbhaar v. Griffiths, 25 A. 64 (Pa. 1892) (shareholder
cannot rescind sale of stock to secretary of corporation who discloses all information he has and
conceals neither condition of corporation nor value of stock); Fisher v. Budlong, 10 R.I. 525
(1873) (liability solely because director was acting as agent for shareholder in sale of stock and
abused that relationship to obtain shares for himself at price lower than their actual value);
Deaderick v. Wilson, 67 Tenn. 108 (1874) (directors are free to purchase stock from
shareholder in corporation on same terms as others unless prohibited by legislative action);
Hume v. Steele, 59 S.W. 812 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900) (liability based only on actual fraud);
Haarstick v. Foxx, 33 P. 251 (Utah 1893), atd, 156 U.S. 674 (1895) (no duty of disclosure
absent active misrepresentation); Wilgus, supra note 120, at 267 (citing no pre-1900 cases
calling for disclosure absent some special agency relationship outside of director-shareholder).
123. See, e.g., Hooker v. Midland Steel Co., 74 N.E. 445 (Ill. 1905); Walsh v. Goulden,
90 N.W. 406 (Mich. 1902).
124. Oliver v. Oliver, 45 S.E. 232, 234-35 (Ga. 1903).
125. Stewart v. Harris, 77 P. 277, 279 (Kan. 1904). C. Von Au v. Magenheimer, 110
N.Y.S. 629 (N.Y. App. Div. 1908) (stockholder in nonpublic corporation who was induced to
sell shares by misrepresentation on part of management has action for damages). In Steinfeld
v. Neilsen, 100 P. 1094 (Ariz. 1909), rev'd, 224 U.S. 534 (1912), the lower court followed
Oliver and Stewart but found no liability because the plaintiff had equal access to the informa-
tion. On remand, the court appeared to follow the special circumstances rule of Strong v.
Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909), but found no special circumstances justifying imposition of a
fiduciary duty. Steinfeld v. Nielsen, 139 P. 879 (Ariz. 1914).
126. 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
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"special circumstances" the stockholder was entitled to recession or damages
for fraud.' 27
After Strong, the trend was clearly towards the special circumstances
rule. By 1937 one commentator, in fact, argued that the special circum-
stances rule had become the majority, or at least the plurality, rule and that
the fiduciary duty rule had been adopted in a substantial minority of juris-
dictions. 1 Both rules continued to gather adherents thereafter. 2 9
While the special circumstances rule and the minority rule now prob-
ably represent the majority view, the no duty rule retains some adherents
even amongst the modem decisions."o In some states, the fiduciary duty
necessary to make insider trading a violation of the federal securities laws
thus is still absent. Even in those states where the special circumstances or
fiduciary duty rules have been adopted, moreover, state law will often fail
to supply the requisite duty because both rules are more limited in applica-
tion than in doctrine." In particular, both rules applied only to face-to-face
transactions.In For our purposes, cases dealing with impersonal transactions
conducted on secondary trading markets are far more relevant. The uniform
state law approach in the secondary market context remained a no duty rule.
The leading stock exchange case is Goodwin v. Agassiz. "' The defend-
ants were directors and senior officers of a mining corporation. A geologist
127. Id. at 434-35. Larry Mitchell argues that the special circumstances rule was not based
on fiduciary duty principles. Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Jurisprudence of the Misappropriation
Theory and the New Insider Trading Legislation: From Fairness to Efficiency and Back, 52
ALBANY L. REv. 775, 795-99 (1987). As Professor Mitchell concedes, however, the Supreme
Court has consistently interpreted the special circumstances rule as arising out of fiduciary
principles. Id. at 798 n.96.
128. Lake, supra note 120, at 448-49.
129. See, e.g., Broffe v. Horton, 172 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1943) (diversity case); Childs v.
RIC Group, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 1078, 1081 (N.D. Ga. 1970) (diversity case), atd, 447 F.2d
1407 (5th Cir. 1971); Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co., 159 P.2d 958 (Cal. 1945). An early line
of federal cases arising under Rule 10b-5 applied the special circumstances and, more often, the
fiduciary duty rules to face-to-face insider trading transactions. See, e.g., Kohler v. Kohler Co.
319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951).
130. See, e.g., Goodman v. Poland, 395 F. Supp. 666, 678-80 (D. Md. 1975); Fleetwood
Corp. v. Mirich, 404 N.E.2d 38, 46 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Yerke v. Batman, 376 N.E.2d 1211,
1214 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978).
131. Virtually all of the cases adopting these rules involved active fraud, not mere
nondisclosure, by the insider defendants. Michael Conant, Duties of Disclosure of Corporate
Insiders Who Purchase Shares, 46 CORNELL L. REv. 53, 59-62 (1960).
132. MICHAEL P. DOOLEY, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATION LAW IV-138 (temp. ed.
1992).
133. 186 N.E. 659 (Mass. 1933).
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came up with a theory suggesting that there might be substantial copper de-
posits in northern Michigan. The company thought the theory had merit
and began securing mineral rights options on the relevant tracts of land.
Meanwhile, the defendants started buying shares on the market. The plain-
tiff was a former stockholder who had sold his shares on the market. The
shares apparently had been bought by the defendants although, of course,
neither side knew of the other's identity. Plaintiff later sued, arguing that
he would not have sold if the geologist's theory had been disclosed.
The court rejected plaintiff's argument, holding that the defendants had
no duty to disclose nonpublic information before trading in the firm's
securities."3 That the trades took place on an impersonal secondary trading
market was the central rationale of the court's holding. In the court's view,
honest directors would be put in a difficult position if they were required
to disclose everything they then knew about the corporation before trading
in its stock.'
Although it is now of considerable antiquity, at least by corporate
law standards, Goodwin apparently remains the prevailing state law
view."'36 At least insofar as trading on secondary markets is concerned, the
SEC thus seriously erred when it asserted in Cady, Roberts that the
common law imposed fiduciary duties on corporate insiders that trade with
shareholders. As we have seen, the law varied substantially from state to
state, and even in the jurisdictions where the requisite duty existed, it was
arguably limited to face-to-face transactions involving unusual fact
situations. Justice Powell's treatment of the Cady, Roberts duty as the
basis for imposing federal insider trading liability was thus something of a
stretch.
Assuming state law imposes no duty running from insiders to
shareholders when trading on secondary trading markets, insiders could still
be held liable under the misappropriation theory if their trades violate a
duty owed to the corporation to refrain from self-dealing in nonpublic
corporate information. Here too, however, there is a perfectly respectable
argument that insider trading by senior officers and managers is not a
violation of their fiduciary duties to the corporation.
134. Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659, 661 (Mass. 1933).
135. Id.
136. See generally 3A FLETCHER CYC CORP § 1168.1 (perm. ed. 1986). This is subject
to the caveat, however, that many states in which the rule currently exists by virtue of cases




Diamond v. Oreamuno is the leading case holding that insider trading
violates the insider's fiduciary duties.' 37 In Diamond, the company's
earnings were plummeting and the defendants used their advance knowl-
edge of that fact to bail out of the stock. Once the decline in earnings was
made public, the market price of the shares dropped by over half.
Plaintiff shareholder brought a derivative suit alleging that defendants
had breached their fiduciary duties to the corporation. Although the court
held that a corporate officer or director may not use nonpublic corporate
information to personally profit by trading in the firm's securities, its
rationale for that result is quite sparse. Stripped to its essentials, the
analysis relied on three purportedly analogous doctrines: the insider trading
prohibition under the federal securities law, the Delaware Chancery Court's
decision in Brophy v. City Services Co. ," and the agency law rule that a
person that acquires special knowledge or information by virtue of a
confidential or fiduciary relationship may not exploit that information to
make a personal profit. None of the three, however, provides a very
convincing justification for Diamond's holding.
At the time Diamond was decided, the federal insider trading
prohibition consisted of the short-swing profit rule under Exchange Act
Section 16(b) and Rule 10b-5 as interpreted by the TGS and Cady, Roberts
decisions.' 39 Neither had anything to do with the problem at hand.
TGS was driven by concerns about access to information rather than
breach of duty. 4 Section 16(b) is a strict liability rule, as to which
questions of fiduciary duty are simply irrelevant. So long as defend-
ant's trades fall within the statutory six-month period and fall outside the
various exemptions created by the SEC and the courts, the defendant
loses even if his trades breached no duty to the corporation or its share-
holders.1
4'
Brophy also offers little support for Diamond. In the first place, like
Diamond, it relied on agency law concepts. 142 As we shall see in a mo-
137. 248 N.E.2d 910 (N.Y. 1969).
138. 70 A.2d 5 (Del. Ch. 1949).
139. See Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910, 913-16 (N.Y. 1969).
140. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 851-52 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). A further complication is caused by the double liability that
Diamond now permits because disgorgement actions will sound under both state and federal
law. See Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 195 (7th Cir. 1978).
141. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1993).
142. Brophy v. City Servs. Co., 70 A.2d 5, 7-8 (Del. Ch. 1949).
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ment, agency law arguably does not support the Diamond result, although
it may support Brophy's.
In the second, Brophy is factually distinguishable from Diamond. The
information on which the insider traded was the knowledge that the
corporation was about to begin a stock repurchase program. 143 In a sense,
the insider was competing with the corporation, which agency and cor-
porate law proscribe.'" Moreover, while the court did not require a
showing of corporate injury, the insider's conduct in fact directly threat-
ened the corporation's interests. If his purchases caused a rise in the stock
price, the corporation would be injured by having to pay more for its own
purchases. 
145
In contrast, the Diamond insiders' conduct involved neither competi-
tion with the corporation nor a direct threat of harm to it.146 The court
made two moves to evade this problem. First, it asserted that proof of
injury was not necessary in order for a breach of duty to be found. 47 As
we shall see, this is a plausible position, but also one that has not found
uniform acceptance. Second, the court inferred that the corporation might
have suffered some harm as a result of the defendants' conduct, even
though the complaint failed to allege any such harm. In particular, the
court surmised that the defendants' conduct might have injured the
corporation's reputation.' 48 As I have argued elsewhere, however, this is
not a very likely source of corporate injury.14 9 This second move therefore
is even less convincing then the first. As a result, Diamond does not
necessarily follow from Brophy.
Finally, agency law constituted the third leg of Diamond's supporting
tripod. Like the other legs, however, it is at best problematic. According
143. Id. at 7.
144. Cf. Conant, supra note 131, at 65 (insider's conduct "was a breach of a confidential
relation by an employee").
145. Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 194 (7th Cir. 1978). Admittedly, absent some
leak, a single insider's purchases are unlikely to have a significant price effect. See Bain-
bridge, supra note 113, at 10-11.
146. See Freeman, 584 F.2d at 194. The information in question related to a historical
fact. As such, it simply was not information the firm could use. In particular, the only
imaginable firm use for this information would be if the firm itself were to buy or sell its
securities before announcing the decline in earnings. As the Freeman court pointed out, the
corporation could not lawfully trade in that manner. Id.
147. Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912 (N.Y. 1969).
148. Id.
149. Bainbridge, supra note 113, at 12-16.
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to the Restatement of Agency, the principal-agent relationship is a fiduciary
one with respect to matters within the scope of the agency relationship.
150
More to the point for present purposes, Section 388 of the Agency
Restatement imposes a duty on agents to account for profits made in
connection with transactions conducted on the principal's behalf.... The
comments to that section further expand this duty's scope, requiring the
agent to account for any profits made by the use of confidential information
even if the principal is not harmed by the agent's use of the information.'
Because the law of agency therefore appears to provide the requisite
fiduciary duty, establishing the existence of an agency relationship also is
generally assumed to suffice for imposing insider trading liability under the
post-Chiarella federal prohibition.'
One can plausibly argue, however, that the apparent bar on insider
trading created by agency law is not as strict as it first appears. The broad
prohibition of self-dealing in confidential information appears solely in the
comments to Sections 388 and 395. In contrast, the black letter text of
Section 388 speaks only of profits made "in connection with transactions
conducted by [the agent] on behalf of the principal."'15 4 One must stretch
the phrases "in connection with" and "on behalf of' pretty far in order to
reach insider trading profits. Similarly, Section 395, which speaks directly
to the issue of self-dealing in confidential information, only prohibits the
use of confidential information for personal gain "in competition with or to
the injury of the principal."' 55 Arguably, agency law thus tracks the law
governing lawyers in requiring an injury to the principal before a breach of
fiduciary duty can be found.
This argument is supported by Freeman v. Decio,56 the leading case
rejecting Diamond's approach. In Freeman, the court noted both Diamond
and the position expressed in the comments to Sections 388 and 395, but
nonetheless held that corporate officers and directors could not be held
liable for insider trading as a matter of state corporate law without a show-
150. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 13 (1958) [hereinafter AGENCY RESTATE-
MENT].
151. Id. § 388.
152. Id. § 388 cmt c.
153. E.g., United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1028 n.5 (2d Cir. 1986), aff'd on
other grounds, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
154. AGENCY REsTATEMENT, supra note 150, § 388.
155. Id. § 395.
156. 584 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1978).
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ing that the corporation was injured by their conduct. 15 7 Under Freeman,
insider trading by corporate insiders thus does not constitute a breach of
duty absent a showing of injury to the corporation.158 As such, if incorpo-
rated into the federal prohibition, Freeman would provide an important
escape valve for insiders.
Admittedly, the insiders' state law arguments are not as strong in
this context as they are vis-a-vis bondholders. As to the insiders' duties
to shareholders, the leading cases are now of considerable antiquity.
More important, the trend in the case law was towards imposing fiduciary
duties on insiders. 59 Indeed, even Goodwin plausibly can be read as an
application of the special circumstances, rather than the no duty, rule to
secondary trading markets. " Finally, the American Law Institute's
(ALI) corporate governance project opines that a duty to refrain from
self-dealing in confidential corporate information exists in both face-to-
face and stock exchange transactions."' All of which suggests that
some state courts might recognize such a duty if the issue arose today. 62
157. Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 192-95 (7th Cir. 1978).
158. Accord Schein v. Chasen, 313 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1975). Moreover, the duty in
question is not the type of duty required by Dirks. See Freeman, 584 F.2d at 194 (suggesting
that duty in question was more akin to duty of care than to duty of loyalty).
159. Professor Loss suggests that the "evolution of the common law toward the 'minor-
ity' view [the fiduciary duty rule] was aborted by the on-slaught of Rule 10b-5." LEWIS
Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 820 (1983). If so, judicial adoption of
this Article's thesis can be expected to renew the development of state law, which may lead
to a renewed evolution towards the no-duty rule. Indeed, Professor Branson suggests that
such a trend is already visible. DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 506-07
(1993); Branson, supra note 120. For a good discussion of the current state of the case law,
along with a holding "that a director, who solicits a shareholder to purchase his stock and
fails to disclose information not known to the shareholder that bears upon the potential
increase in the value of the shares, shall be liable to the shareholder," see Bailey v. Vaughn,
359 S.E.2d 599, 605 (W.Va. 1987).
160. For example, the court's analysis of the type of information in question concluded
that the theory was "at most a hope." Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659, 661 (Mass. 1933).
Further, the court said that "in the circumstances" there was no affirmative duty to disclose.
Id.
161. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOvERNANCE: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 5.04(a) (Proposed Final Draft 1992) [hereinafter ALI PRIN-
CIPLES]. Given the controversy that surrounded the ALI project, it is still too early to tell
whether it will be regarded as authoritative on this and other corporate law issues. In any
case, it is at least amusing that the only citation of support offered by the Reporter for the
proposition that this duty extends to secondary market transactions is a "but see" cite to
Goodwin. See id. at 377.
162. Cf. Treadway Cos., Inc. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 375 (2d Cir. 1980)
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At the very least, however, the insider's state law argument deserves to be
taken seriously.
A similar situation prevails with respect to the insider's duties to the
corporation. Although Diamond has not won universal acceptance, as
illustrated by Freeman, the ALI's corporate governance project adopted the
Diamond approach. 6 Indeed, there is a perfectly plausible argument that
Diamond was correctly decided. The Freeman court conceded that if all
confidential information relating to the firm is treated as a corporate asset,
then one need not show an injury to the corporation in order for the
insider's trades to constitute a breach of duty. The court said, however,
that doing so would put the cart before the horse. In its view, one should
first ask whether there was any potential loss to the corporation before
deciding whether to treat the information in question as a firm asset."6 In
fact, however, there is a strong argument for treating all nonpublic infor-
mation to which insiders become privy by virtue of their position as a firm
asset.161 Nevertheless, the insider's state law argument must be taken
seriously so long as Freeman remains on the books.
D. Summary
The central lesson of the analysis in this section should now be ap-
parent. To the extent the federal insider trading prohibition depends upon
state law fiduciary duty concepts, the prohibition's scope becomes substan-
tially narrower than is usually assumed. Many classes of inside traders that
now routinely suffer draconian penalties should escape liability. At a
minimum, insider trading prosecutions become more complex. One must
establish that the defendant was subject to the requisite fiduciary duty under
applicable state law and that the defendant's conduct breached that duty.
To be sure, such an inquiry is not undertaken in current insider trading
prosecutions. Why not? Perhaps in their mad rush to judgment, courts
have simply ignored the complexity of the analysis mandated by Chiarella
and Dirks. Alternatively, perhaps the requisite fiduciary duty is to be found
somewhere other than in state law. The next section considers these
possibilities.
(restating no liability rule as applied by New Jersey state courts, albeit subject to caveat that
New Jersey might no longer follow rule).
163. Id. at 361.
164. Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 193 (7th Cir. 1978).
165. See infra part VI.B.2.
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VI. Should a Uniform Federal Rule Be Created?
Part II demonstrated that the history of the insider trading prohibition
since TGS has been one of expansion and contraction. Aided and abetted by
the lower federal courts, the SEC has consistently sought to expand the pro-
hibition's scope. The Supreme Court twice called a halt to this process. On
both occasions, however, the SEC and the lower courts found ways of com-
.plying with the letter of the Supreme Court's holdings, while evading their
spirit.
This unwillingness to accept restrictions on the federal prohibition's
scope may go a long Way towards explaining the failure to give state law
arguments the serious attention they deserve. As the preceding Part
demonstrated, looking to state law for the requisite fiduciary duty makes the
prohibition more complex and fragile than proponents of an expansive
prohibition might like. But so what? The question is whether the state law
rules just recounted have any role in the federal prohibition and, if so, what
role they should be given.
The possible contraction and complication of the federal prohibition
argues for creation of a unique federal rule only if incorporation of state law
would frustrate some identifiable policy goal of the feddral securities laws.
Exploring this remaining issue is the task to which this Part is addressed.
A. The Traditional Justification for the Federal Prohibition
In order to determine whether incorporation of state fiduciary duties
would frustrate important federal policies, such that a unique federal fiduciary
duty should be created, we first must identify the reason insider trading is a
matter of federal regulatory concern. As we shall see, none of the standard
securities law policy arguments can justify the federal prohibition."6 Given
that the prohibition itself cannot be justified on these grounds, it follows that
any effect incorporating state law might have on these policies cannot justify
creation of a unique federal fiduciary standard.
1. Congressional Intent
Recall that Justice Powell asserted in Dirks that "[a] significant purpose
of the Exchange Act was to eliminate the idea that use of inside information
166. With the exception of the mandatory disclosure argument in part VI.A.2.a, I (like
many others) have treated these arguments in detail elsewhere. See Bainbridge, supra note
36, at 49-63; Bainbridge, supra note 113, at 9-16. Accordingly, the arguments are sketched
here only briefly. As to the argument that insider trading offends the federal policy of
preventing fraud in securities transactions, see supra part IV.
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for personal advantage was a normal emolument of corporate office." 67 This
claim might be used to justify creating a uniform federal rule. , As the argu-
ment would run, Congress established eliminating insider trading as an im-
portant federal policy, which would be undermined if the prohibition was
forced to rely upon the vagaries of state law. This argument, however,
proves too much.
Careful examination of the legislative history demonstrates that regulating
insider trading was not one of the original purposes of the Exchange Act. 168
Neither Section 10(b) nor Rule lOb-5 explicitly regulates insider trading or
prohibits nondisclosure of inside information in insider trades. Instead, Con-
gress addressed insider trading in Section 16(b), which permits the issuer of
affected securities to recover insider short-swing profits. 169 Section 16(b) im-
poses quite limited restrictions on insider trading. It does not reach transac-
tions occurring more than six months apart, nor does it apply to persons other
than those named in the statute or to transactions in securities not registered
under Section 12.170 Given that Congress could have struck at insider trading
both more directly and forcefully, and given that Congress chose not to do
so,' there is no statutory authority for the creation of a more sweeping
167. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653 n.10 (1983); accord H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 2276 [hereinafter cited as
HoUSE 1TSA REPORT].
168. See generally Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 459-62; Michael P. Dooley, Enforcement
of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REV. 1, 55-69 (1980); Frank H. Easterbrook,
Insider Trading Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information,
1981 SuP. CT. REv. 309, 317-20. The argument that neither Section 10(b) nor Rule 10b-5
originally prohibited insider trading, once made chiefly by academic opponents of the
prohibition, has come to be recognized even by certain segments of the popular press. For
example, as The Economist observed:
There was no attempt by the 1934 legislators to outlaw insider trading by
stockbrokers, other insiders (and outsiders) who came into possession of
privileged information. It was not until 1942 that the commission tackled the
problem. It promulgated the so-called rule 10b-5 under the section of the 1934 act
which allowed it to lay down rules to protect the public. But again, there was no
specific mention of insider trading. The rule simply forbad securities trading
based on fraudulent activity. It was to be left to the courts to decide what was and
was not fraudulent.
ECONOMIST, June 30, 1984, at 68.
169. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1993).
170. Id.
171. The first version of § 16 (§ 15 in draft) permitted corporate recovery of both insider
and tippee short-swing profits and prohibited the tipping of confidential information by
insiders. Stock Exchange Regulation: Hearing on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1934)
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prohibition under Section 10(b).
To be sure, Section 10(b) is often described as a "catchall" intended to
capture various types of securities fraud not expressly covered by more
specific provisions of the Exchange Act." What the SEC catches under
Section 10(b), however, must not only be fraud, but also within the scope of
the authority delegated to it by Congress. 173 Nothing in the legislative his-
tory suggests that Congress intended Section 10(b) to create a sweeping
prohibition of insider trading. 74 To the contrary, Section 10(b) received
minimal attention during the hearings on the 1934 Act and was apparently
seen simply as a grant of authority to the SEC to prohibit manipulative
devices not covered by Section 9. 1'
Indeed, if Congress intended in 1934 that the SEC use Section 10(b) to
craft a sweeping prohibition on insider trading, the Commission was quite
dilatory in doing so. Section 10(b) is not self-executing. It merely pro-
scribes such fraudulent or manipulative devices as the SEC may prohibit by
rule. Rule lOb-5, the foundation on which the modem insider trading
prohibition rests, was not promulgated until 1942. Nor did the Commission
[hereinafter cited as Stock Exchange Regulation Hearing]. The House deleted both
provisions, but the restriction on insider short-swing profits was restored in conference. S.
Doc. No. 185, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17 (1934). In fact, there is even a plausible argument
that Congress did not even intend to proscribe insider trading through § 16, but rather
intended mainly to address insider manipulation. See Dooley, supra note 168, at 56-58.
172. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234-35 (1980).
173. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212-14 (1976) ("The rulemaking
power granted to an administrative agency ... is not the power to make law. Rather, it is
'the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect the will of Congress as expressed by the
statute.'"); cf. Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (invalidating
SEC Rule 19c-4 as exceeding scope of SEC's authority under Exchange Act Sections 14(a)
and 19(c)).
174. See Dooley, supra note 168, at 55-59; Easterbrook, supra note 168, at 319. There
is an oft-quoted passage in one of the Senate reports relating to the Exchange Act, which is
usually read as indicating a congressional intent to proscribe insider trading. See S. REP. No.
1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1934), quoted in House YTSA Report, supra note 167, at 3,
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2276. ("Among the most vicious practices unearthed at
the hearings ... was the flagrant betrayal of their fiduciary duties by directors and officers
of corporations who used their positions of trust and the confidential information which came
to them in such positions, to aid them in their market activities."). Dooley has demonstrated
that this passage does not deal with insider trading as we understand the term today, but
rather with manipulation. See Dooley, supra note 168, at 56 n.235.
175. See Dooley, supra note 168, at 59; Stock Exchange Regulation Hearing, supra note
171, at 115 (testimony of Thomas G. Corcoran, Reconstruction Finance Corp.) Corcoran




begin using Rule 10b-5 to regulate insider trading on stock exchanges until
the Cady, Roberts decision in 1961.76 Even in Cady, Roberts's wake there
were those who thought it did not presage general application of Rule lOb-5
to insider trading."7 As we now know, that short-lived expectation died
with SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. 78 The point remains, however, that the
federal insider trading prohibition is a relatively recent administrative and
judicial creation lacking any significant statutory basis: "In regulating insider
trading under rule lOb-5 the lower federal courts and the SEC have been
operating without benefit of support from the legislative history of the 1934
Act or from the language of section 10(b). In plainer words, they have
exceeded their authority. "1
79
Since- Professor Dooley wrote those "plainer words," of :course,
Congress has twice amended the Exchange Act for the specific purpose of
enhancing the penalties associated with insider trading."sa In so doing, it has
176. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). Dooley argues that prior to
Cady, Roberts, the SEC apparently did not view Rule lOb-5 as governing insider trading,
citing among other things a lengthy, article on insider trading co'uthored by then SEC
Chairman Cook that does not even mention Rule lOb-5. See Dooley, supra note 168, at 61
(citing Donald C. Cook & Myer Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchange
Act, 66 HARv. L. Rsv. 385, 612 (1953)). This appears to be true, insofar as insider trading
on public secondary markets is concerned. The handful of Rule lOb-5 decisions cited as
precedent by Cady, Roberts uniformly involved face-to-face transactions or control trans-
actions. See, e.g., Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951) (omissions
in connection with what amounted to tender offer); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F.
Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (sale of control negotiated face to face); In re Ward La France
Truck Corp., 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943) (same). As such, they do not support extension of Rule
lob-5 or Section 10(b) to modem insider trading violations on impersonal stock exchanges.
Interestingly, in a pre-TGS case arising under Rule lOb-5, the Seventh Circuit applied the
special circumstances rule to a face-to-face transaction, which confirms that there was no
general bar on insider trading prior to TGS. See Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th
Cir. 1963).
177. See, e.g., Recent Decision, 48 VA. L. REv. 398, 403-04 (1962) ("[i]n view of the
limited resources of the Commission, the unfortunate existence of more positive and
reprehensible forms of fraud, and the inherent problems concerning proof and evidence
adhering to any controversy involving a breach of duty of disclosure, there is little prospect
of excessive litigation evolving pursuant to [Cady, Roberts]."). But see Comment, Broker
Silence and Rule 10b-5: Expanding the Duty to Disclose, 71 YALE L.J. 736, 747 (1962)
("While the SEC confined itself to a holding on the narrow situation in the present case, it is
likely that the Cady, Roberts decision is a warning that it will move in the direction of
expanding the scope of liability.").
178. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
179. Dooley, supra note 168, at 59.
180. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988); Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98
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consistently encouraged vigorous SEC enforcement of the federal insider
trading prohibition.' 8' This sort of ex post facto indication of legislative
intent is usually viewed skeptically."S In this instance, however, the recent
amendments appear to be an authoritative congressional endorsement of the
insider trading prohibition. It is therefore worth taking a close look at what
those amendments did and, more important, what they did not do.
Where Congress has revised a statute without reversing prior on-point
judicial holdings, that failure has been taken as evidence of congressional
approval of those holdings.'83 On neither of the occasions on which it has
amended the Exchange Act to address insider trading did Congress see fit to
reverse either Rule 14e-3 or the misappropriation theory. To the contrary,
the legislative history of both acts is replete with statements of congressional
approval of those theories."4 Indeed, Section 2 of the 1988 Insider Trading
and Securities Enforcement Act provides a congressional finding that the
SEC's rules "governing trading while in possession of material, nonpublic
information are, as required by the Act, necessary and appropriate in the
public interest and for the protection of investors."" The House Report
further states that "[t]hese findings are intended as an expression of congres-
sional support for these regulations.""'
On the substantive level, the 1988 Act overruled Moss v. Morgan,
Stanley, Inc. , 'I in which the Second Circuit had held that private parties did
not have standing to sue under the misappropriation theory. The 1988 Act
Stat. 1264 (1984).
181. E.g., H.R. REP. No. 910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-16 (1988).
182. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND 'MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 757-60 (1988).
183. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353
(1982).
184. E.g., H.R. REP. No. 910, supra note 181, at 10, 26; H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1983). In 1987, Congress considered proposals to statutorily define
insider trading. Rosenbaum & Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 233. At that time, the SEC
argued that a definition was not needed. Id. SEC General Counsel Daniel L. Goelzer,
however, told the Senate Securities Subcommittee that if Carpenter invalidated the misappro-
priation theory, the SEC would have "a desperate need" for legislation re-establishing it. 1d.
at 231 n.21. The Supreme Court's failure to do so probably explains the 1987 bill's demise,
which further buttresses the sense of congressional approval of the present regime.
185. Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988).
186. H.R. REP. No. 910, supra note 181, at 35. See generally Howard M. Friedman,
The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, 68 N.C. L. REv. 465,
481-83 (1990).
187. 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984).
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expressly created a private party cause of action for insider trading cases."'
Because a private party cause of action existed as to all other types of insider
trading violations, Congress's action amounts to an express legislative
endorsement of the misappropriation theory."S9
In light of this evidence of congressional support, Rule 14e-3 and the
misappropriation theory ought to be immune from legal challenge, Bryan
notwithstanding. One nevertheless should not read too much into the 1984
and 1988 amendments. While both acts treat insider trading as a matter of
federal concern, neither addresses the substantive definition of insider
trading in any meaningful way. At most, all Congress did in these acts was
to endorse the misappropriation and Rule 14e-3 theories of liability. Other
than purporting to resolve any doubts as to their validity, both acts left the
task of defining insider trading to the courts.190
188. 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (1993).
189. Larry Mitchell argues that the 1988 Act's standing provisions implicitly overruled
Chiarella. Mitchell, supra note 127, at 838. Professor Mitchell is undoubtedly correct in
arguing that the 1988 Act's standing provisions at least illustrate, and at worst exacerbate, the
doctrinal incoherence of the modem federal insider trading prohibition. See id. at 777-78.
Nevertheless, Professor Mitchell's argument that the 1988 Act has substantive implications
for the definition of insider trading is unpersuasive for two reasons: First, it directly conflicts
with the clearly stated congressional intent to avoid defining or even affecting the substantive
definition. Second, it is unsupported by subsequent judicial opinions. Professor Mitchell's
argument is based on a distinction between regulation of conduct and effects. Id. at 785-89.
He asserts that the 1988 Act implicitly endorses an effects-based regulatory scheme, which
thereby returns the law to its pre-Chiarella state. Id. at 838. Subsequent cases, however,
continue to apply a conduct-based definition of insider trading. E.g., United States v.
Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992).
190. Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 472-73; Stuart J. Kraswell, An Insider's View of the
Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, 45 Bus. LAW. 145, 157-58
(1989). Congress did so mainly because insider trading is difficult to define with precision.
Congress also was concerned that even if a clear statutory definition could be devised, inside
traders would find ways of evading it. Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 472-73; Kraswell, supra,
at 150-51. Accordingly, Congress deliberately left the definition of insider trading as vague
and unconstrained as possible. In light of the draconian penalties associated with insider
trading after the 1984 and 1988 acts, however, this decision raises troubling vagueness
concerns. As Jonathan Macey bluntly put it, "opposition to a clear, fixed definition for the
crime of insider trading constitutes nothing less than a naked power grab by the SEC, a
move obviously at odds with the most elemental notions of justice and fair play." JONA-
THAN R. MACEY, INSIDER TRADING: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND POLICY 64 (1991). Or
as Ed Kitch put it, somewhat less bluntly, "[t]he fact that the agency finds it more com-
fortable to avoid the discipline of defining the offense before bringing the charge is no reason
for eschewing the increased fairness and deterrent efficacy that would flow from the
exercise." Edmund W. Kitch, A Federal Vision of the Federal Securities Laws, 70 VA. L.
REV. 857, 861 (1984).
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Even if the 1984 and 1988 acts should be seen as a congressional
endorsement of the then-existing judicial definition of insider trading,
moreover, consider what those acts endorsed: An incoherent body of law in
which state law fiduciary duty principles arguably had some role, but whose
role had not been clearly defined. As such, Congress's action in amending
the statute need not be read as foreclosing the use of state law fiduciary
duties as the rule of decision. Indeed, it is noteworthy that courts which
have addressed the fiduciary duty question since the 1984 and 1988 acts have
continued to make at least referential use of state law rules.'91 The defini-
tional problem thus remains a matter of federal common law. Defining
insider trading, moreover, remains a matter as to which state fiduciary duty
principles may be looked to as the rule of decision.
2. Federal Securities Law Policy and Insider Trading
In the absence of specific congressional guidance, the definition of
insider trading should be determined by reference to the broader policy goals
of the federal securities laws. To pose the question somewhat differently,
do the general purposes of the securities laws require a uniform federal rule
of decision? Commentators have put forth various rationales for regulating
insider trading."2 Only three, however, are directly related to the purposes
of the securities laws: protection of the mandatory disclosure system,
protection of investors, and maintaining public confidence in the securities
market.'93 None of these goals is advanced by regulating insider trading,
just as none would be frustrated by deregulating insider trading. A fortiori,
none stands as a bar to incorporation of state law fiduciary duties.
a. Insider Trading and the Mandatory Disclosure System
Mandatory disclosure is arguably the central purpose of the federal
securities laws. Both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act are based on
a policy of mandating disclosure by issuers and others. The Securities Act
creates a transactional disclosure regime, which is applicable only when a
firm is actually selling securities. In contrast, the 1934 Exchange Act
191. See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
192. See generally Bainbridge, supra note 36, at 49-63.
193. Professor Thel contends that the "fundamental purpose of the [Exchange] Act" is
"to protect the public's interest in the integrity of security prices." Steve Thel, The Original
Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 392




creates a periodic disclosure regime, which requires on-going, regular, dis-
closures. "
Neither Act requires a firm to disclose all nonpublic information re-
lating to the firm.'95 Instead, when premature disclosure would harm the
firm's interests, the firm is generally free to refrain from disclosing such
information.196 Even proponents of the mandatory disclosure system ac-
knowledge that it is appropriate to strike this balance between "investors'
needs for disclosure [and] management's legitimate need for secrecy.'"'7
According to Professor Roberta Karmel, the federal insider trading
prohibition is necessary to the effective working of the mandatory disclosure
system. She posits that the prohibition ensures "that confidentiality is
not abused and utilized for the personal and secret profit of corporate
managers and employees or persons associated with a bidder in a tender
offer." 9 8 Many reputable corporate law scholars, of course, doubt whether
mandatory disclosure is a sound policy. 19 If the mandatory disclosure
system ought to be done away with, Karmel's argument collapses at the
starting gate. For present purposes, however, I take the mandatory
disclosure system as a given and limit my inquiry to whether a prohibition
of insider trading is necessary to protect the mandatory disclosure system
from abuse.
Karmel offers several different rationales for her claim that an insider
trading prohibition is a necessary supplement to the mandatory disclosure
system. At one point in the analysis, she opines that such a prohibition is
necessary "to preserve the fairness, honesty and integrity of the public
securities markets."' This argument adds little, if anything, to the claims
that an insider trading prohibition is necessary to protect investors and
preserve public confidence in the integrity of the markets. Because those
claims are wrong, as the following sections demonstrate, this prong of
Karmel's argument falls with them.
194. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1993).
195. Roberta S: Karmel, The Relationship Between Mandatory Disclosure and Prohibi-
tions Against Insider Trading: Why a Property Rights Theory of Insider Trading Is Untenable,
59 BROOK. L. REv. 149, 169-70 (1993).
196. Id. at 170.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 170-71.
199. E.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAw 276-314 (1991); ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN
CORPORATE LAw 91-96 (1993).
200. Karmel, supra note 195, at 174.
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At another point in the analysis, Karmel asserts that an insider trading
prohibition is necessary to prevent managers from reaping "secret" profits."0
In the first place, absent a violation of fiduciary duty, secret profits are
wholly unproblematic. In the second place, what does taking of secret prof-
its have to do with the mandatory disclosure regime?' Mandatory disclos-
ure is intended to get material information to investors in a timely fashion. 3
If managers profit from nonpublic information, but their trading activities do
not affect the timing of disclosure, investors will receive information at the
same time as they would have received it in the absence of insider trading.
As such, so long as the timing of disclosure is not affected, the mandatory
disclosure regime's principal goal is unaffected by insider trading.
The insider trading prohibition thus is relevant to the mandatory dis-
closure regime only insofar as it affects managers' incentives to manipulate
the timing of disclosure. From this perspective, Karmel's argument fails on
both explanatory and justificatory grounds. True, unwarranted delays in
disclosing corporate information result in social costs. Despite the strong
bias in the federal securities laws towards prompt disclosure of material
developments, there are many circumstances in which the firm is permitted
to delay disclosure, such as when it could be preempted by competitors or
otherwise would be unable to take advantage of the development. This type
of delay reduces market efficiency, but is justified because prompt disclosure
in such circumstances would reduce the firm's incentive to produce socially
valuable information. The resulting loss of market efficiency, however,
requires that the delay be no longer than necessary for the firm to capture the
development's value.
While insider trading poses some risk of causing this sort of delay,'
the risk is undoubtedly quite minimal. The available empirical evidence
suggests that measurable delay attributable to insider trading is rare.5 This
201. Id. at 170-71.
202. Michael Dooley points out that insider trading can be treated as a compensation
question, which may lead to disclosure problems. Insider compensation is one of the many
items of mandatory disclosure under the SEC's regulations. Failure to disclose insider
trading profits thus might be treated as a material omission, which would give rise to a claim
for fraud. DOOLEY, supra note 132, at IV-221. This does not necessitate a prohibition of
insider trading, however, just enforcement (or, at most, expansion) of the Exchange Act's
existing rules on disclosure of insider trading profits.
203. See Karmel, supra note 195, at 171 ("information must be made publicly available
to investors as soon as its dissemination will no longer do more harm than good to
shareholders . . . .").
204. Bainbridge, supra note 113, at 9-10.
205. Dooley's 1980 survey of the 37 reported insider trading decisions between 1966 and
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finding is not particularly surprising. Given the rapidity with which
securities transactions can be conducted in modem secondary trading
markets, an insider need at most delay disclosure long enough for a five-
minute telephone conversation with his stockbroker. Even if the insider
wished to cover his tracks by trading through an elaborate network of off-
shore shell corporations, very little delay is entailed once the network is up
and running. Delay also often will be readily detectible by the insider's
supervisors.
In fact, insider trading seems more likely to create incentives for
insiders to prematurely disclose information than to delay its disclosure.
Suppose the firm enters into merger negotiations with a potential acquirer.
An insider with power to affect the timing of disclosure trades on that
information. Having made his purchase, the insider has an incentive to
cause disclosure of the firm's plans as soon as possible. Absent leaks, the
merger will have no price effect until it is disclosed to the market, at which
time there usually is a strong positive effect. Once the information is dis-
closed the insider will be able to reap substantial profits, but until disclosure
takes place he bears a variety of firm-specific and market risks. The deal,
the stock market, or both may collapse at any time. Early disclosure enables
him to minimize those risks by selling out as soon as the price jumps in
response to the announcemeht. While premature disclosure threatens the
firm's interests, that threat has little to do with the mandatory disclosure
system. Instead, it is properly treated as a breach of the insider's fiduciary.
duty.
Finally, if the concern really is ensuring timely disclosure, the insider
trading prohibition sweeps far too broadly. As we have seen, the prohibition
encompasses a host of actors both within and outside the firm. In contrast,
only a few actors are likely to have the power to affect the timing of
disclosure.' A much narrower prohibition thus would suffice if this were
the true reason for regulating insider trading. Indeed, if this were the real
concern, one need not proscribe insider trading at all. Instead, one could
strike at the problem much more directly by proscribing failing to disclose
material information in the absence of a legitimate corporate reason for
doing so.
1980 found but a single case in which disclosure was delayed. Dooley, supra note 168, at
34.
206. Cf. Bainbridge, supra note 113, at 9-10 (arguing that few lawyers are in position
to affect timing of disclosure). More junior executives and outsiders could affect the timing
of disclosure by delaying transmission of information to their superiors. Upon close
examination, however, this concern is overstated. Id.
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b. Investor Protection and Maintenance of
Confidence in the Markets
The purposes of the Securities Exchange Act generally and Section
10(b) in particular are usually said to be the protection of investors and the
maintenance of public confidence in the securities markets through the
imposition of disclosure requirements and prohibitions of fraud.' If so, the
insider trading prohibition seems quite out of place in the federal securities
laws. Neither policy justifies a ban on insider trading, nor can either policy
explain the state of the law.
i. Investor Protection
The goal of investor protection implicitly assumes that the regulated
conduct harms investors.0 8 This is simply not true with respect to insider
207. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus. v. Green; 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977) ("Mhe fundamental
purpose of the 1934 Act" is "to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy
of caveat enqptor."); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228,
235 (2d Cir. 1974); Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 760 (5th Cir. 1974); In re Cady,
Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 910 (1961).
208. The Supreme Court has sometimes stated a more expansive version of the investor
protection purpose of the securities laws, claiming that they are intended to protect "the
investing public and the national economy through the promotion of 'a high standard of
business ethics ... in every facet of the securities industry.'" Bateman Eichler, Hill
Richards, Inc. v. Bemer, 472 U.S. 299, 315 (1985). Some scholars question whether insider
trading is necessarily unethical. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 199, at 261-
62; Jonathan R. Macey, Ethics, Economics, and Insider Trading: Ayn Rand Meets the Theory
of the Firm, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y. 785 (1988). Others, however, regard insider
trading as falling short of ethical standards. See Bainbridge, supra note 113, at 39-40;
Dooley, supra note 168, at 55. But even if insider trading is inconsistent with a high standard
of business ethics, many unethical practices in fact lie outside the scope of the securities laws.
Indeed, the Court has observed of insider trading itself that:
Depending on the circumstances, and even when permitted by law, one's trading
on material nonpublic information is behavior that may fall below ethical standards
of conduct. But in a statutory area of the law such as securities regulation, where
legal principles of general application must be applied, there may be "significant
distinctions between actual legal obligations and ethical ideals."
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 661 (1983) (quoting SEC, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF
SEcuRrEs MARKsrs, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., lst Sess., pt. 1,237-38 (1963)). Cf.
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232 (1980) ("[Nlot every instance of financial
unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity under § 10(b)"). Violation of family confidences
would strike many as reprehensible behavior, for example, but Chestman held that it did not
suffice for insider trading liability to be imposed. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d
551, 570-71 (2d Cir. 1991). The ethics of insider trading are thus irrelevant to the question
of whether a uniform federal rule should be established.
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trading. Insider trading is said to harm the investor in two principal ways.
Some contend that the investor's trades are made at the "wrong price." A
more sophisticated argument is that the investor is induced to make a bad
purchase or sale. Neither proves convincing on close examination.
An investor that trades in a security contemporaneously with insiders
having access to material nonpublic information likely will allege injury in
that he sold at the wrong price; that is, a price that does not reflect the
undisclosed information. If a firm's stock currently sells at $10 per share,
but after disclosure of the new information will sell at $15, a shareholder
who sells at the current price thus will claim a $5 loss. The investor's claim,
however, is fundamentally flawed. It is purely fortuitous that an insider was
on the other side of the transaction. The gain corresponding to shareholder's
"loss" is reaped not just by inside traders, but by all contemporaneous
purchasers whether they had access to the undisclosed information or not.
To be sure, the investor might not have sold if he had had the same
information as the insider, but even so, the rules governing insider trading
are not the source of his problem. Irrespective of whether insiders are
permitted to inside trade or not, the investor will not have the same access
to information as the insider. In the former case, the insider will not dis-
close before trading. In the latter, assuming perfect deterrence, the insider
will not trade, but the information will still remain confidential.
Unless immediate disclosure of material information is to be required,
a step the law has been unwilling to take, there will always be winners and
losers in this situation. Surely then it makes little sense to claim that the
shareholder is injured when his shares are bought by an insider, but not
when they are bought by an outsider without access to information.' To
the extent the selling shareholder is injured, his injury is correctly attributed
to the rules allowing corporate nondisclosure of material information, not to
insider trading.
The more sophisticated argument is that the price effects of insider
trading induce shareholders to make poorly advised transactions, but this
argument too is flawed.2"' In the first instance, insider trading rarely
209. As we shall see, disparities in access to information are a major contributor io the
perception of unfairness associated with insider trading. See infra note 223 and accompany-
ing text. A sense of unfairness, however, is not the same as an actual injury.
210. The flip side -of the inducement argument is that insider trading may preempt
investors from making beneficial trades. Professor Wang argues that:
Instead of inducing opposite trade transactions, an inside trade may preempt
trades of the same type. When an inside trade directly or indirectly changes a
specialist/market-maker's inventory, the new pattern of quotations may either
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produces the sort of price effects necessary to induce shareholders to trade.
The stock of any given corporation "represents only a particular combination
of expected return and systematic risk, for which there is a vast number of
substitutes. ,211 The correct measure for the supply of securities thus is not
simply the total of the firm's outstanding securities, but the vastly larger
number of securities with a similar combination of risk and return. Supply
and demand effects caused by insider trading therefore cannot have a
significant price effect. z2
Gilson and Kraakman argue that the price effect of insider trading is an
example of what they call the "derivatively informed trading mechanism" of
market efficiency. 23  Derivatively informed trading affects market prices
through a two-step mechanism. First, those possessing material nonpublic
information begin trading. Their trading has only a small price effect.
Next, the market gradually reacts, provided there is leakage or tipping of the
information, observation of insider trades by otherwise uninformed traders,
or following of price fluctuations by uninformed traders.2 4 The problem is
that while derivatively informed trading can affect price, the effects occur
slowly and sporadically. 25 Given the inefficiency of derivatively informed
trading, price or volume changes resulting from insider trading thus will
only rarely be of sufficient magnitude to induce investors to trade.2" 6
induce new transactions or ones that would otherwise have occurred. For
example, if an inside trade increases a market-maker's inventory, he may lower
his price quotations to encourage purchases from him and deter sales to him. If
an inside trade decreases the market-maker's inventory, he may increase his prices
to encourage sales to him and deter purchases from him.
William Wang, Trading on Material Nonpublic Information on Impersonal Stock Markets, 54
S. CAL. L. REV. 1217, 1236 (1981). This is a sophisticated argument, but is likely to be
important only when the market for the corporation's shares is unusually thin or the insider's
trades are usually large. Only in those instances is the price or volume effect of insider
trading likely to have the effect Wang suggests.
211. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency,
70 VA. L. REV. 549, 630 (1984).
212. See id.; see also Easterbrook, supra note 168, at 335-37.
213. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 211, at 630.
214. Id. at 572-79.
215. Id. at 631.
216. The empirical evidence tends to support this view. Early market studies indicated
that insider trading had an insignificant empirical effect on price in most cases. See Roy A.
Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price, 53 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1443 (1967) (citing studies). A more
recent study found that while insider transactions were followed by a strong price effect, such
transactions were only rarely based on exploitation of nonpublic information. Dan Givoly &
Dan Palmon, Insider Trading and the Exploitation of Inside Information: Some Empirical
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Assuming for the sake of argument that insider trading produces notice-
able price effects, however, and further assuming that some investors are
misled by those effects, 7 the inducement argument is further flawed because
many transactions would have taken place regardless of the price changes
resulting from insider trading. Those investors benefitted from insider
trading because they purchased at a price closer to the "correct" price - the
price that would prevail if the information were disclosed. 2 s In any case,
it is hard to tell how the inducement argument plays out when investors are
examined as a class. For any given number that decide to sell because of a
price rise, another group of investors may decide to defer a planned sale in
anticipation of further increases.
ii. Maintaining Confidence in the Markets
In the absence of a credible investor injury story, the protection of
investors goal of the federal securities laws does not justify a uniform federal
fiduciary standard. The lack of investor injury also undercuts the related
goal of maintaining investor confidence in the integrity of the securities
markets. If investors are not injured by insider trading, why should insider
trading affect their confidence in the securities markets?
There is no denying that many, if not most, investors are angered by
insider trading.219 A Business Week poll, for example, found that 52% of
Evidence, 58 J. Bus. 69 (1985). Finally, the SEC's chief economist has reached the debata-
ble conclusion that pre-announcement price and volume run-ups in takeovers are most likely
attributable to factors other than insider trading. See Rosenbaum & Bainbridge, supra note
2, at 235.
On the other hand, a more recent study of insider trading cases brought by the SEC dur-
ing the 1980s found that insider trading led to quick price changes. Lisa Meulbro6k, An Em-
piricalAnalysis ofillegal Insider Trading, 47 J. FIN. 1661 (1992). The author attributes this
result in part to the increase in trading volume resulting from insider trading, which in turn
is detected by market professionals who then begin trading. Id. at 1695. It is worth noting,
however, that many of the SEC's insider trading cases during the relevant period resulted
from computer analysis of stock market activity. See Securities Regulation Issues, Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the Comm. on Energy and Com-
merce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 89-96 (1987). As such, despite the author's attempt to control
for selection biases, it seems likely that the study remains inherently biased towards cases in
which insider trading produced noticeable volume effects, which in turn suggests that it may
not be a reliable predictor of whether insider trading generally has significant price effects.
217. The latter assumption is at least as questionable as the former. See HENRY MANNE,
INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 94-95 (1966); Henry Manne, In Defense of
Insider Trading, HARv. Bus. REv., Nov.-Dec. 1966, at 114.
218. Dooley, supra note 168, at 35-36; Manne, In Defense, supra note 217, at 114.
219. As Professor Coffee pointedly observed, "No contemporary observer can mistake
1241
52 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 1189 (1995)
the respondents wanted insider trading to remain unlawful.' As I have
argued elsewhere, this anger can damage the reputation of particular firms."
If so, perhaps the same feelings also could affect investors' confidence in the
markets.
In order to determine whether investor anger over insider trading in fact
undermines their confidence in the markets, one must first identify the
source of that anger. A Harris poll found that 55 % of the respondents said
they would inside trade if given the opportunity.'m Of those who said they
would not trade, 34% said they would not do so only because they would be
afraid the tip was incorrect. Only 35 % said they would refrain from trading
because insider trading is wrong. Here then lies one of the paradoxes of
insider trading. Most people want insider trading to remain illegal, but most
people (apparently including at least some of the former) are willing to
participate if given the chance to do so on the basis of accurate information.
This paradox is central to evaluating arguments based on confidence in the
market. Investors that are willing to inside trade if given the opportunity
obviously have no confidence in the integrity of the market in the first
instance. Any anger they feel over insider trading therefore has nothing to
do with a loss of confidence in the integrity of the market, but instead arises
principally from envy of the insider's greater access to information.m
The loss of confidence argument is further undercut by the stock
market's performance since the insider trading scandals of the mid-1980s.
The enormous publicity given those scandals put all investors on notice that.
insider trading is a common securities violation. If any investors believe that
the SEC's enforcement actions drove insider trading out of the markets, they
are beyond "mere legal help. " 4 At the same time, however, the years since
the fact that the public wanted Ivan Boesky to go to jail." John C. Coffee, Jr., Hush!: The
Criminal Status of Confidential Information After McNally and Carpenter and the Enduring
Problem of Overcriminalization, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 121, 148 (1988).
220. LANGEVOORT, supra note 89, at 8 n.8. This is, of course, something short of an
overwhelming majority. Hence, at the outset, one must be careful not to overstate the extent
to which investors are angered by insider trading.
221. Bainbridge, supra note 113, at 14-16.
222. DOOLEY, supra note 132, at IV-256.
223. "Under any 'game' theory of the market, a player is likely to consider unfair any
advantage gained by his competitors that he not only does not have, but that he cannot
obtain." J. A. C. Hetherington, Insider Trading and the Logic of the Law, 1967 Wis. L.
REv. 720, 721.
224. Cf. Dooley, supra note 168, at 35 ("If there are any [sophisticated investors] who
are still unaware that otherwise unexplained market movements may be caused by insider
trading they are beyond merely legal help.").
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the scandals have been one of the stock market's most robust periods.'
One can but conclude that insider trading does not seriously threaten the
confidence of investors in the securities markets.'
iii. The Anomalies
The preceding sections demonstrated that the investor protection and
confidence in the market rationales do not justify an insider trading
prohibition. These rationales prove equally unconvincing from an explana-
tory perspective. Under current law, investors' rights vary widely de-
pending on the identity of the trader, the nature of the inside information,
and the source of that information. If investor protection or confidence in
the market were the real issues, the relevance of such factors would be hard
to justify. As such, neither policy necessitates creation of a unique federal
fiduciary duty.
Consider United States v. Carpenter,' the leading misappropriation
case. R. Foster Winans wrote the Wall Street Journal's "Heard on the
Street" column, a daily report on various stocks that is said to affect the
price of the stocks discussed. Journal policy expressly treated the column's
contents prior to publication as confidential information belonging to the
newspaper. Despite that rule, Winans agreed to provide several co-conspir-
ators with prepublication information as to the timing and contents of future
columns. His fellow conspirators then traded in those stocks based on the
expected impact of the column on the stocks' prices, sharing the profits.'
Winans and his co-conspirators were convicted of securities, mail, and
wire fraud for their participation in this scheme. In affirming their
convictions, the Second Circuit held that Winans's breach of his fiduciary
duty to the Wall Street Journal satisfied the standards laid down by the
225. Near the end of 1985, the Dow Jones Industrial Average stood at 1550. N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 11, 1985, at D7. As of this writing, the Dow stands at almost three times that
level.
226. The experience of other countries confirms this conclusion, although one of course
must be cautious in using such evidence in light of cultural and historical differences. For
example, Japan only recently began regulating insider trading and its rules are not enforced.
Hong Kong has repealed its insider trading prohibition. Both have vigorous and highly liquid
stock markets. See MACEY, supra note 190, at 44. Macey also convincingly argues that
regulating insider trading may in fact do more harm to investor confidence than would
deregulating it. Id. at 42-44.
227. 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), aft'd, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
228. United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1026-27 (2d Cir. 1986), aft'd, 484 U.S.
19 (1987).
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Supreme Court in Chiarella and Dirks.z 9 From either an investor protection
or confidence in the market perspective, however, this outcome seems
bizarre at best. For example, any duties Winans owed in this situation ran
to an entity that had neither issued the securities in question nor even
participated in stock market transactions. What Winans's breach of his
duties to the Wall Street Journal has to do with the federal securities laws is
thus not immediately apparent.'
The incongruity of the misappropriation theory becomes even more
apparent when one considers that its logic suggests that the Wall Street
Journal could lawfully trade on the same information used by Winans.23' If
we are really concerned with protecting investors and maintaining their
confidence in the market's integrity, the inside trader's identity ought to be
irrelevant. From the investors' point of view, insider trading is a matter of
concern only because they have traded with someone who used their superior
access to information to profit at the investor's expense 32 As such, it would
not appear to matter whether it is Winans or the Journal on the opposite side
of the transaction. Both have greater access to the relevant information than
do investors.
The logic of the misappropriation theory also suggests that Winans
would not have been liable if the Wall Street Journal had authorized his
trades. 3 In that instance, his trades would not have constituted an improper
conversion of nonpublic information and the essential breach of fiduciary
229. On certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed the convictions on securities, mail, and
wire fraud. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987). Because the Court affirmed the
securities fraud convictions by an evenly divided four-four vote, the decision did not address
the validity of the misappropriation theory. Rosenbaum & Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 232.
230. Rosenbaum & Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 242 n.85. In Zweig v. Hearst Corp.,
521 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975), the Ninth Circuit held that a
newspaper columnist had a duty to disclose his financial stake in the impact of his columns.
As the Carpenter court implicitly acknowledged, however, Zweig probably did not survive
Chiarella. Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1034.
231. See Rosenbaum & Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 242 n.85 (criticizing this result); cf.
Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1033 (recognizing this interpretation's possibility, but declining to
rule on its validity).
232. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
233. Whether the owner of nonpublic information could authorize someone else to use
it for trading purposes is an interesting open issue under the misappropriation theory. See
LANGEVOORT, supra note 89, at 194-95. If the deciding court adheres to the misappropri-
ation theory's internal logic, authorized trading should not result in liability. The requisite
conversion of information simply is not present. If courts are simply using the misappropri-
ation theory to comply with the letter of the Chiarella-Dirks framework while closing the
loopholes it creates, however, they will find a way to punish authorized trading.
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duty would not be present. Again, however, from an investor's perspective,
it would not seem to matter whether Winans's trades were authorized or not.
Finally, conduct that should be lawful under the misappropriation
theory is clearly proscribed by Rule 14e-3. A takeover bidder may not
authorize others to trade on information about a pending tender offer, for
example, even though such trading might aid the bidder by putting stock in
friendly hands.' If the acquisition is to take place by means other than a
tender offer, however, Rule 14e-3 will not apply and the misappropriation
theory should not either. From an investor's perspective, howevrer, the form
of the acquisition seems just as irrelevant as the identity of the inside trader.
As the saying goes, this is no way to run a railroad. Yet these
anomalies only begin to scratch the surface. A host of other oddities and
.incongruities have crept into the federal insider trading prohibition in the
years since Chiarella.3 All of them are a direct result of Chiarella's
imposition of a fiduciary duty requirement. None of them are easily explic-
able from either an investor protection or a confidence in the market
rationale.
B. Devolution Versus Incorporation
As the preceding section demonstrated, insider trading significantly
implicates none of the principal purposes of the federal securities laws and,
therefore, it cannot be said that important federal policies would be
frustrated if state law were incorporated into the prohibition. Indeed, to the
contrary, the analysis to this point undoubtedly appears to be more an
argument for devolving responsibility for insider trading back to the states,
than one for incorporating state fiduciary duties into the federal prohibition.
Much of the analysis that follows, moreover, will buttress that impression.
There are, however, good reasons for thinking that the latter course is
preferable. First, political reality: Although the modem insider trading
prohibition was created by courts, Congress has brought insider trading
within the statutory scope of the securities laws. Accordingly, while courts
remain free to define insider trading, they are no longer free to do away with
the federal prohibition itself. Major reform, such as devolution, thus must
come from Congress. But one can tell a fairly straightforward public choice
story about insider trading, which reveals that a federal prohibition has
strong interest group support, while there simply is no proreform constitu-
ency. Second, one can also tell a fairly convincing story that outlines a
234. Rosenbaum & Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 236-37.
235. For a catalog of some of the more troubling anomalies, see id. at 241-45.
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public-regarding rationale for treating enforcement of the insider trading
prohibition as a matter for the federal Securities and Exchange Commission.
As such, both political reality and sound public policy argue for retaining a
federal common-law prohibition of insider trading, but incorporating state
fiduciary duties as the rule of decision.
1. The Public Choice Story
This Part relies on the well-established economic model of regulation
in which rules are sold by regulators and bought by the beneficiaries of the
regulation. 6 Into that model we can plug slightly different, but wholly
compatible, stories about insider trading told by two prominent scholars.
One explains why the SEC wanted to sell insider trading regulation, while
the other explains to whom it has been sold. By putting these stories
together, we obtain a complete answer to the question of why insider trading
became a matter of federal concern and, more important for present
purposes, is likely to remain a federal concern.
a. The Sellers' Story
In 1980, Professor Michael Dooley explained the federal insider trading
prohibition as the culmination of two distinct trends in the securities laws.
First, as do all government agencies, the Commission desired to enlarge its
jurisdiction and enhance its prestige.237 According to one widely accepted
theory of bureaucratic behavior, administrators can maximize their salaries,
power, and reputation by maximizing the size of their agency's budget.2 8
A vigorous enforcement program directed at a highly visible and unpopular
law violation is surely an effective means of attracting political support for
larger budgets. Given the substantial media attention directed towards
insider trading prosecutions, and the public taste for prohibiting insider
trading, it provided a very attractive subject for such a program.
Second, during the prohibition's formative years, there was a major
effort to federalize corporation law. 9 In order to maintain its budgetary
priority over competing agencies, the SEC wanted to play a major role in
236. For a description of this general model, see William Landes & Richard Posner,
The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 877
(1975).
237. Dooley, supra note 168, at 62.
238. See GLEN 0. RoBINSON, AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY 85 (1991).
239. Dooley, supra note 168, at 59-61.
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federalizing matters previously within the state domain.' According to
Dooley, regulating insider trading was an ideal target for federalization. 24
Rapid expansion of the federal insider trading prohibition purportedly
demonstrated the superiority of federal securities law over state corporate
law. Because the states had shown little interest in insider trading for years,
federal regulation demonstrated the modernity, flexibility, and innovative-
ness of the securities laws.242 The SEC's prominent role in attacking insider
trading thus placed it in the vanguard of the movement to federalize
corporate law and ensured that the Commission would have a leading role
in any system of federal corporations law.'
240. In the seminal Cady, Roberts decision, the Commission acknowledged and em-
braced the federalization process: "The securities acts may be said to have generated a wholly
new and far-reaching body of Federal corporation law." In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40
S.E.C. 907, 910 (1961). In addition, during the late 1970s the Commission considered im-
posing a variety of corporate governance rules, which would have essentially superseded state
corporation law in many respects. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Short Life and Resur-
rection of SEC Rule 19c-4, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 565, 603 n.176 (1991).
241. Dooley, supra note 168, at 62.
242. Id.
243. Id. While Dooley's argument explains the Commission's interest in federalizing
corporate law, an interesting question is why the courts cooperated with the SEC. According
to a leading theory ofjudicial behavior, "judges seek to impose their personal preferences and
values on society." RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 534 (1992). If so,
the effort to federalize corporate law becomes easy to understand. First, during the 1960s
and '70s, it was conventional wisdom among the legal elites - from which federal judges
tend to be selected - that state corporate law was fundamentally flawed. See Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Independent Directors and the ALl Corporate Governance Project, 61 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 1034, 1045 (1993). This would be reflected in the tenor of their decisions
defining the boundaries between state and federal law. Second, creating a federal common
law of corporations would substantially increase the amount of corporate litigation within the
federal court system, giving federal judges many more opportunities to impose their personal
views on business corporations. Again, the unpopularity of insider trading and the states'
hands-off approach made it a logical candidate for early federalization.
I find this vision of the judicial role unappealing from a normative perspective and
unpersuasive from an explanatory perspective. As I have argued elsewhere, judges properly
should seek to, and in fact do, enforce not their personal preferences but rather those policies
and moral norms that have substantial support in the community. Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Social Propositions and Conunon Law Adjudication, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 231. Judicial
cooperation with the SEC's federalization program, however, is explicable from this perspec-
tive as well. In light of the conventional wisdom that state corporate law was seriously
flawed and that insider trading was undesirable, judges seeking to faithfully enforce 'those
policy and moral norms having substantial community support would have supported
federalizing insider trading law. The lingering effects of the conventional wisdom probably
go far to explain the continuing willingness of the lower courts to support an expansive fed-
eral insider trading prohibition. From this perspective, efforts to reform the prohibition will
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We can test Dooley's argument by asking whether it explains subse-
quent events. Consider, for example, the SEC's devotion of significant
enforcement resources to insider trading during the 1980s. During the
1980s, the SEC embarked upon a limited program of deregulating the securi-
ties markets. Among other things, the Commission adopted a safe harbor
for projections and other soft data,2" the shelf registration rule,2' the inte-
grated disclosure system,2 and expanded the exemptions from registration
under the Securities Act.247 The deregulatory trend motivated one long-time
critic of the SEC to compliment the Commission for being "well on the road
toward a sensible disclosure system with much of the dead wood, idio-
syncracies, overregulation, and overdrafting eliminated.2 1 8 At about the
same time, however, the SEC adopted a vigorous enforcement campaign
against insider trading. Not only did the number of cases increase substan-
tially, but the Commission adopted a "big bang" approach under which it
focused on high visibility cases that would produce substantial publicity.249
In part this may have been due to an increase in the frequency of insider
trading,' but Dooley's analysis nicely explains the Commission's renewed
interest in insider trading as being motivated by a desire to preserve its
budget during an era of deregulation and spending restraint."
Dooley's argument also explains the SEC's continuing attachment to the
equal access approach to insider trading. The equal access policy generates
an expansive prohibition that federalizes a broad range of conduct otherwise
succeed only if judges become convinced that the conventional wisdom is in error.
244. Securities Act Release No. 6084, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
82,117 (June 25, 1979).
245. Securities Act Release No. 6499, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 83,449 (Nov. 17, 1983).
246. Securities Act Release No. 6383, Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,328 (Mar. 3,
1982).
247. Securities Act Release No. 6389, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 83,106 (Mar. 8, 1982).
248. Homer Kripke, Has the SEC Taken All the Dead Wood Out of Its Disclosure
System?, 38 Bus. LAW. 833 (1983).
249. Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 466-67.
250. Id.
251. This hypothesis also nicely explains the big bang enforcement policy. Dooley
points out that TGS could have been prosecuted as a violation of the proxy rules, while "the
government could have avoided the insider trading complications in Carpenter by charging
Winans with fraudulent misrepresentation .... One assumes that insider trading charges
make better newspaper copy and thus generate bigger headlines than indictments for mis-
representation." DOOLEY, supra note 132, at IV-221 n.f.
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left to state corporate law, while also warranting a highly active enforcement
program. As such, the Commission's use of Rule 14e-3 and the misappro-
priation theory to evade Chiarella and Dirks makes perfect sense. By these
devices, the Commission restored much of the prohibition's pre-Chiarella
breadth and thereby ensured that its budget-justifying enforcement program
would continue unimpeded.
b. The Buyers'Story
If Dooley's account is correct, as it seems to be, the record of insider
trading prosecutions is quite curious. In the years prior to Chiarella, the
SEC was a willing supplier of insider trading regulation, but insider trading
prosecutions were quite rare.' After Chiarella, however, the number of
insider trading prosecutions increased substantially. 3 As we have seen,
Dooley's thesis can be extended to the post-Chiarella era. We are thus not
surprised that the SEC remained ready to supply insider trading regulation.
But where did the demand for regulation come from?
In 1991, Professor Jonathan R. Macey published a short monograph on
insider trading, from which one can extract an answer to this question.'
His analysis applies public choice theory to the insider trading problem. A
basic tenet of public choice analysis is that well-defined, politically influen-
tial interest groups use their influence with lawmakers to obtain legal rules
that benefit themselves at the expense of larger, more diffuse groups.'
Macey argues that the post-Chiarella insider trading rules have been
supported and driven in large part by market professionals, a cohesive and
politically powerful interest group, which the post-Chiarella regime
effectively insulates from insider trading liability. 56
252. Id. at IV-234.
253. Id. at IV-237.
254. MACEY, supra note 190. The monograph summarized and updated an argument
he had previously put forth in collaboration with Professor David Haddock. See David D.
Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, Regulation on Demand: A Private Interest Model, with an
Application to Insider Trading, 30 J.L. & ECON. 311 (1987).
255. DANiELA. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 23-24 (1991).
256. See MACEY, supra note 190, at 17-18. Macey argues that Rule 14e-3, which is so
strikingly different than the rest of the federal insider trading prohibition, is designed to
protect the interests of target managers, another well-defined and politically powerful interest
group. Id. Rule 14e-3 prohibits the practice of warehousing takeover securities, which
hostile bidders otherwise could use to put target company securities into friendly hands before
commencing a bid. Id. at 19-20. As an alternative to Macey's market professional argument,
one might extend his analysis of Rule 14e-3 to the entirety of the insider trading prohibition.
No one disputes that managers of large corporations have a good deal of political influence
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The post-Chiarella prohibition strongly supports Macey's thesis. Only
insiders and quasi-insiders such as lawyers and investment bankers have a
greater degree of access to nonpublic information that might affect a firm's
stock price than do market professionals. By basing insider trading liability
on breach of fiduciary duty, and positing that the requisite fiduciary duty
exists with respect to insiders and quasi-insiders but not with respect to
market professionals, the prohibition protects the latter's ability to profit
from new information about a firm.
Market professionals benefit in a variety of ways from the present
ban.257  When an insider trades on an impersonal secondary market, the
insider takes advantage of the fact that the market maker's or specialist's bid-
ask prices do not reflect the value of the inside information. Because market
makers and specialists cannot distinguish insiders from noninsiders, they
cannot protect themselves from being taken advantage of in this way. When
trading with insiders, the market maker or specialist thus will always be on
the wrong side of the transaction." If insider trading is prohibited, how-
ever, the market professionals are no longer exposed to this risk.
Professional securities traders likewise profit from the fidilciary-duty-
based insider trading prohibition. 59  Because professional investors are
often active traders, they are highly sensitive to the transaction costs of
trading in securities. Prominent among these costs is the specialist's and
market-maker's bid-ask spread. If a ban on insider trading lowers the
at the SEC. If they believe insider trading is detrimental to their firms' interests, they could
be expected to support a prohibition thereof.
Because market professionals are also the key constituencies of the congressional
committees that control securities regulation, Macey's thesis also provides a convincing
explanation for Congress's behavior with respect to insider trading during the 1980s. On the
one hand, Congress substantially increased the penalties for insider trading, which should
have further deterred it by those subject to the prohibition. On the other hand, Congress did
not change the substantive definition of insider trading, which ensured that the relevant
interest groups remained immune from prosecution.
257. See DOOLEY, supra note 132, at IV-254 to -255; MACEY, supra note 190, at 13-
15.
258. DOOLEY, supra note 132, at IV-255.
259. Institutional investors also fall within the classes of market professionals that benefit
from the insider trading rules. Like the investment banking community, institutional in-
vestors are an important SEC constituency. They also constitute a well-defined and relatively
cohesive interest group that is well-positioned to capture the SEC's regulatory agenda. From
this perspective, it is significant that institutional investors are one of the principal consumers
of advice from professional market analysts. MACEY, supra note 190, at 13. They thus stand
to benefit from any informational advantage the insider trading prohibition gives to the
professional market analysts that supply them with information.
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risks faced by specialists and market-makers, some portion of the resulting
gains should be passed on to professional traders in the form of narrower
bid-ask spreads.7
Circumstantial evidence for Macey's thesis 'is provided by. com-
paring pre- and post-Chiarella enforcement patterns. As we have seen,
the frequency of insider trading prosecutions rose dramatically after
Chiarella. Strikingly, however, in the years immediately prior to Chiarella,
those enforcement proceedings that did take place often targeted market
professionals. 6' Aftef Chiarella, market professionals were rarely
charged. 262
As we did with Dooley's argument, we can also test Macey's hypothesis
by asking whether it explains subsequent developments. Consider, for
example, the problem of selective disclosure. When analysts receive
information from corporate insiders, which is not made available to the
public at large, the SEC has taken the position that the disclosure constitutes
a tip that gives rise to liability under Dirks's tipping rules for both the insider
and the analyst. 23 At first blush, this seems inconsistent with Macey's
thesis. But if specialists and market makers are the subclass of market
professionals with the greatest political influence with the SEC on this issue,
as seems at least possible,' an answer to this puzzle emerges. Just as the
insider trading prohibition allows specialists to trade without fear of doing
business with insiders with superior information, the SEC's pursuit of
selective disclosure to analysts ensures that the specialist or market maker
need not fear the possibility of doing business with clients of an analyst that
has superior information.
260. David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, A Coasian Model of Insider Trading, 80
Nw. U. L. REV. 1449, 1457-58 (1987).
261. DOOLEY, supra note 132, at IV-234.
262. Id. at IV-237.
263. Id. at IV-254.
264. Many market makers and specialists are controlled by full-service securities firms,
which also employ market analysts. In attempting to identify which subclass of market
professionals has the most political power at the SEC, these firms seem the most likely
candidates. The question thus becomes whether these firms are likely to prefer rules that
favor the market making or the analysis side of their business. Dooley suggests that rules
against selective disclosure "may diminish the potential returns to individual firms from
trading and advising customers, [but] the industry as a whole may gain from decreased costs
in competing for genuinely new information." 1d. at IV-254. If so, fully integrated firms
should prefer the market making side of their business. As such, their influence with the
SEC will be used on behalf of that part of their business rather than their market analysis
business.
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2. A Public-Regarding Story
Dooley's and Macey's arguments do not tell a very appealing story.
Taken together, they demonstrate that the insider trading prohibition
advances no important federal policy. Instead, the prohibition is driven
largely by the venal interests of bureaucrats and the entities they supposedly
regulate. It is nevertheless possible to identify a public-regarding justifica-
tion for the federal insider trading prohibition; namely, protection of prop-
erty rights in valuable information. As the only public-regarding justifica-
tion for regulating insider trading, however, the protection of property rights
rationale strongly argues for using state law fiduciary duty concepts to
supply the fiduciary duty element of the federal prohibition.' 5
a. The Property Rights Rationale for Regulating Insider Trading
There is an emerging consensus that the federal insider trading
prohibition is most easily justified as a means of protecting property rights
in information. 2' There are essentially two ways of creating property rights
in information: allow the owner to enter into transactions without disclosing
the information or prohibit others from using the information. In effect, the
federal insider trading prohibition vests a property right of the latter type in
the owner of nonpublic information.
265. Some commentators argue that courts should simply enforce the bargain struck by
legislators and special interests. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Court and the
Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1984). Professor Macey has persuasively argued
against this approach. Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through
Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 223 (1986). Even
if the former view prevails, however, it is singularly inapt in the present context. While
Dooley's and Macey's arguments permit us to describe a coherent bargain, the bargain might
be said to exist at judicial sufferance. As we have seen, neither Congress nor the SEC has
attempted to define insider trading. To the contrary, Congress has expressly left the
definitional issue to the courts. See supra part VI.A.1. In so doing, Congress knew that
courts might modify the definition of insider trading in ways that narrowed the prohibition's
scope. Because Congress nevertheless failed to restrict the courts' ability to do so, even
judges adopting Easterbrook's view should not regard themselves as bound to any particular
definition of insider trading.
266. See, e.g., United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 576-78 (2d Cir. 1991) (Winter,
J., concurring), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992); DOoLEY, supra note 132, at IV-221
to -224; Bainbridge, supra note 113, at 21-23; Easterbrook, supra note 168; Jonathan R.
Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The New Directions of the Rules Against Insider Trading,
13 HOFSTRA L. REv. 9 (1984); cf. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 161, § 5.04 (treating insider
trading prohibition mainly as question of misappropriation of corporate property); Branson,
supra note 120 (same). But see Karmel, supra note 195, at 168-73.
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At first blush, the insider trading prohibition admittedly does not look
very much like most property rights. To be sure, enforcement of the insider
trading prohibition differs rather dramatically from enforcement of, say,
trespassing laws. The existence of property fights in a variety of intangibles,
including information, however, is well-established. Trademarks, copy-
rights, and patents are but a few of the better known examples of this
phenomenon. There are striking doctrinal parallels between insider trading
and these other types of property rights in information. Using another's
trade secret, for example, is actionable only if taking the trade secret
involved a breach of fiduciary duty, misrepresentation, or theft.2 67 As
Dooley observes, this is "an equally apt summary of the law of insider
trading after Chiarella and Dirks."268
In context, moreover, even the insider trading prohibition's enforcement
mechanisms are not inconsistent with a property rights analysis. Where
public policy argues for giving someone a property right, but the costs of
enforcing such a fight would be excessive, the state often uses its regulatory
powers as a substitute for granting a property right. 9 Insider trading poses
just such a situation. Private enforcement of the insider trading laws is rare
and usually parasitic on public enforcement proceedings.27 Indeed, the very
nature of insider trading makes public regulation essential precisely because
private enforcement is almost impossible." The insider trading prohibi-
tion's regulatory nature thus need not preclude a property-rights-based
analysis.
Such an analysis has both justificatory and explanatory power. From
a justificatory perspective, the rationale for prohibiting insider trading is
precisely the same as the rationale for prohibiting patent infringement or
theft of trade secrets: protecting the economic incentive to produce socially
valuable information. As the theory goes, the readily appropriable nature
of information makes it difficult for the developer of a new idea to recoup
the sunk costs incurred in developing it.2' 2 If an inventor develops a better
mousetrap, for example, he cannot profit on that invention without selling
267. Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable Information, 9
J. LEGAL STUD. 683, 695-96 (1980).
268. DOOLEY, supra note 132, at IV-181.
269. POSNER, supra note 243, at 36.
270. Dooley, supra note 168, at 15-17.
271. Bainbridge, supra note 113, at 29.
272. See generally ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS ch. 4 at
44-48, ch. 5 at 11-29 (2d ed. draft materials quoted by permission of authors); POSNER, supra
note 243, at 38-45.
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mousetraps and thereby making the new design available to potential
competitors. Assuming both the inventor and his competitors incur roughly
equivalent marginal costs to produce and market the trap, the competitors
will be able to set a market price at which the inventor likely will be unable
to earn a return on his sunk costs. Ex post, the rational inventor should
ignore his sunk costs and go on producing the improved mousetrap. Ex
ante, however, the inventor will anticipate that he will be unable to generate
positive returns on his up-front costs and therefore will be deterred from
developing socially valuable information.. Accordingly, society provides
incentives for inventive activity by using the patent system to give inventors
a property right in new ideas. By preventing competitors from appropriating
the idea, the patent allows the inventor to charge monopolistic prices- for the
improved mousetrap, thereby recouping his sunk costs. Trademark, copy-
right, and trade secret law all are justified on similar grounds.
Granted, this argument may not provide quite as compelling a justifi-
cation for the insider trading prohibition as it does for the patent system? 3
A property right in information should be created when necessary to prevent
someone other than the developer of socially valuable information from
appropriating its value before the developer can recoup his sunk costs.
Insider trading, however, often does not affect an idea's value to the
corporation and probably never entirely eliminates its value. Legalizing
insider trading thus would have a much smaller impact on the corporation's
incentive to develop new information than would, say, legalizing patent
infringement.
The property rights approach nevertheless has considerable justificatory
power. Consider the prototypical insider trading transaction, in which an
insider trades in her employer's stock on the basis of information learned
solely because of her position with the firm. There is no avoiding the
necessity of assigning the property right to either the corporation or the
inside trader. A rule allowing insider trading assigns the property right to
the insider, while a rule prohibiting insider trading assigns it to the cor-
poration.
From the corporation's perspective, we have seen that legalizing insider
trading would have a relatively small effect on the firm's incentives to
develop new information. In some cases, however, insider trading will harm
the corporation's interests and thus adversely affect its incentives in this
273. An alternative approach is to ask whether the parties, if they had bargained over the
issue, would have assigned the property right to the corporation or the inside trader. For an
argument that the property right would be assigned to the corporation in the lawyer-corporate-
client context, see Bainbridge, supra note 113, at 27-34.
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,regard. 4 This argues for assigning the property right to the corporation,
rather than the insider. In particular, it is at this point that the court went
awry in Freeman v. Decio. 5 As we saw above, the Freeman court required
a showing of actual injury from insider trading before the information in
question is treated as a corporate asset. 276 Such a case-by-case inquiry
requires litigation of various issues not readily susceptible of proof and,
moreover, runs counter to the general thrust of property rights analysis. In
general, creation of a property right with respect to a particular asset is not
dependent upon there being a measurable loss of value resulting from the
asset's use by someone else. 2 7 Indeed, creation of a property right is
appropriate even if any loss in value is entirely subjective because subjective
valuations are difficult to measure for purposes of awarding damages and
because the possible loss of subjective values presumably would affect the
corporation's incentives to cause its agents to develop new information.27
As with other property rights, the law therefore should simply assume
(although the assumption will sometimes be wrong) that protection of the
corporation's interest maximizes the social incentives for the production of
valuable new information.
Because the relative rarity of cases in which harm occurs to the
corporation somewhat weakens the argument for assigning it the property
right, however, the critical issue may be whether one can justify assigning
the property right to the insider in our prototypical transaction. On close
examination, the argument for assigning the property right to the insider is
even weaker than the argument for assigning it to the corporation. Some
274. The question of whether insider trading harms the affected corporation is often
confused with the question of whether it harms investors or the capital markets. These are
distinct inquiries, however. As the preceding sections indicate, I am skeptical that insider
trading adversely affects markets or investors. In some cases, however, it may adversely
affect the affected corporation. Such cases, of course, are likely to be rare. See Bainbridge,
supra note 113, at 8-16.
275. 584 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1978).
276. See supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
277. I am indebted to Jeff Stake and Tom Ulen for their insights with respect to this
aspect of the problem.
278. Note that this analysis is not intended as an argument for a mandatory rule against
insider trading. As noted below, the mandatory nature of the present insider trading prohibi-
tion seems odd in light of the property rights rationale. See infra note 282. It may be that
the most efficient rule would be a default rule against insider trading, which the parties could
vary by agreement amongst themselves, but that is a question beyond the scope of this article.
For an argument that mandatory prohibitions of insider trading may be justifiable in some
cases, however, see Bainbridge, supra note 113, at 36-39 (arguing for mandatory prohibition
of insider trading by lawyers).
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have argued that legalized insider trading would be an appropriate compensa-
tion scheme. In other words, we might allow insiders to inside trade in
order to give them greater incentives to develop new information. This
argument fails, however, because insider trading is a remarkably inefficient
compensation scheme. Even assuming that the change in stock price that
results once the information is released accurately measures the value of the
innovation, the insider's trading profits are not correlated to the value of the
information. This is so because his trading profits are limited not by the
value of the information, but by the amount of shares the insider can
purchase, which in turn depends mainly upon his ex ante wealth or access
to credit. A second objection to the compensation argument is the difficulty
of restricting trading to those who produced the information. The costs of
producing information normally are much greater than the costs of
distributing it. Thus, many firm employees may trade on the information
without having contributed to its production. The third objection to insider
trading as compensation is based on its contingent nature. If insider trading
were legalized, the corporation would treat the right to inside trade as part
of the manager's compensation package. Because the manager's trading
returns cannot be measured ex ante, however, the corporation cannot ensure
that the manager's compensation is commensurate with the value of his
services.279 The economic theory of property rights in information thus
cannot justify assigning the property right to insiders rather than to the
corporation. Because there is no avoiding the necessity of assigning the
property right to the information in question to one of the relevant parties,
the argument for assigning it to the corporation therefore should prevail.'.
The explanatory power of the property rights approach is nicely
illustrated by considering the implications of the Supreme Court's insider
trading jurisprudence. After Dirks, market analysts were essentially exempt
from insider trading liability with respect to nonpublic information they
279.. Saul Levmore, Securities and Secrets: Insider Trading and the Law of Contracts,
68 VA. L. REV. 117, 150 (1982). Moreover, the manager himself may prefer a less uncertain
compensation package. Because managers are risk adverse, they "would prefer the certainty
of a $100,000 salary to a salary of $50,000 and a 10 percent change of a bonus of $500,000"
from insider trading. The manager will value the "bonus" at 50,000 dollars, but if he collects
it will cost the shareholders the full $500,000. Thus, both the shareholders and the manager
could gain by exchanging a guaranteed bonus for the manager's agreement not to trade on
inside information. Easterbrook, supra note 168, at 332.
280. The argument in favor of assigning the property right to the corporation becomes
even stronger when we move outside the prototypical situation to cases covered by the mis-
appropriation theory. There is no plausible justification for assigning the property right to
those who steal information.
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develop because they usually owe no fiduciary duty to the firms they
research. Dirks thus essentially assigns the property right to such informa-
tion to the market analyst rather than to the affected corporation. This is
justifiable from an economic perspective because market analysts expend
considerable resources to develop valuable information about firms. If the
information produced by market research is socially valuable, the Dirks rule
makes sense because it encourages this activity."
In addition, many of the prohibition's doctrinal oddities make sense if
protection of property rights is the true policy goal.' Consider, for
example, the apparent incongruity that Winans could be held liable for
trading on information about the Wall Street Journal's "Heard on the Street,"
but the Journal could have lawfully traded on the same information. As we
saw in the preceding section, this result makes no sense from a traditional
securities law perspective. From a property rights perspective, however, the
result in Carpenter makes perfect sense: Because the information belonged
to the Journal, it should be free to use the information as it saw fit, while
Winans's use of the same information amounted to a theft of property owned
by the Journal.
b. The Federalism Policies of the Securities Laws
If one accepts protection of property rights as the rationale for
regulating insider trading, it becomes quite difficult to discern any compel-
ling federal interest in doing so. The property rights rationale makes it
obvious that the federal insider trading prohibition has nothing to do with
disclosure or fraud. Instead, like the trade secrets rules, the insider trading
prohibition is mainly concerned with preventing employees and other
fiduciaries from using information belonging to the corporation for personal
gain. As such, the prohibition is unrelated to the traditional purposes of the
securities laws. Indeed, the prohibition is arguably inconsistent with the
federalism policies of those laws.
281. See Macey, supra note 266, at 36.
282. To be sure, not all aspects of the federal prohibition can be so explained. For
example, because property rights generally include some element of transferability, it may
seem curious that federal law at least in some circumstances does not allow the owner of
nonpublic information to authorize others to use it for their own personal gain. See, e.g., 17
C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(d) (1992) (tender offeror may not divulge its takeover plans to anyone
likely to trade in target stock). This does not undermine the general validity of the property
rights justification. Rather, if protection of property rights is taken as a valid public-
regarding policy basis for the prohibition, it gives us a basis for criticizing departures from
that norm.
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As we have seen, the federal insider trading prohibition originated as
part of an effort by the SEC and some courts to federalize corporate law.
Most of this effort's progeny were slain by a series of decisions in which the
Court created significant federalism limitations on the scope of the federal
securities laws. As I have. argued elsewhere, the legislative history of the
Exchange Act demonstrates that Congress intended to leave regulation of
corporate governance to the states. 3 Consistent with this clear congres-
sional intent, the Supreme Court has routinely rejected efforts to create a
federal law of corporations.' To the contrary, because "state regulation of
corporate governance is regulation of entities whose very existence and
attributes are a product of state law,"' the Court has consistently reaffirmed
that:
It. . . is an accepted part of the business landscape in this country for
states to create corporations, to prescribe their powers, and to define the
rights that are acquired by purchasing their shares."s
Of particular relevance to the present problem is the Court's recognition that
state law governs the rights and duties of corporate directors:
As we have said in the past, the first place one must look to determine the
powers of corporate directors is in the relevant State's corporation law.
"Corporations are creatures of state law" and it is state law which is the
font of corporate directors' powers.2r
Oddly, given these decisions, the insider trading prohibition has nevertheless
survived. It does so, however, only at the cost of substantial doctrinal
tension.
Interpreting Chiarella and Dirks as creating a unique federal fiduciary
duty prbscribing insider trading would further compound this doctrinal
tension by bringing the prohibition squarely into conflict with the Supreme
Court's decision in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,2 8 in which the
Supreme Court held that Rule 10b-5 is concerned with disclosure and fraud,
not with fiduciary duties. Prior to Santa Fe, the lower federal courts had
given Rule 10b-5 an increasingly expansive interpretation. 289 Santa Fe was
283. Bainbridge, supra note 240, at 593-616.
284. Id. at 613-16.
285. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987).
286. Id. at 91; see also id. at 89 ("No principle of corporation law and practice is more
firmly established than a State's authority to regulate domestic corporations.").
287. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 478 (1979) (citations omitted).
288. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
289. See Kitch, supra note 190, at 863-66.
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one of a series of cases in which the Supreme Court applied the brakes to
this process. Santa Fe attempted to freeze out minority shareholders of one
of its subsidiaries by means of a statutory short-form merger. The plaintiffs
had a state law remedy available in the statutory appraisal rights provision,
but chose to seek redress under Rule 10b-5. The plaintiffs claimed that the
merger violated Rule 10b-5 because it was effected without prior notice to
the minority shareholders and was done without any legitimate business
purpose. They also claimed that their shares had been fraudulently under-
valued.2'
The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs had not stated a cause of
action under Rule lOb-5.29 For present purposes, Santa Fe's main im-
portance derives from its refusal to allow a Rule lOb-5 cause of action for
breaches of fiduciary duty. The Court was concerned that a decision in
favor of the plaintiffs would result in federalizing much of state corporate
law - in many cases overriding well-established state polidies of corporate
regulation. 2 This concern was well-founded, for if the Court gave these
plaintiffs a federal cause of action, it could not meaningfully justify denying
a federal claim in any breach of fiduciary duty case. The Court simply
refused to give Rule lOb-5 such an expansive reach."9 3
While its holding is not squarely on point, the rationale of Santa Fe is
directly applicable to the problem at hand. The Court held, for example,
that Rule lOb-5 did not reach claims "in which the essence of the complaint
is that shareholders were treated unfairly by a fiduciary."294 This is of
course the very essence of the complaint made in insider trading cases. The
court also held that extension of Rule lOb-5 to breaches of fiduciary duty
was unjustified in light of the state law remedies available to plaintiffs.295 As
we have seen, insider trading plaintiffs likewise have state law remedies
available to them. Granted, those remedies vary from siate to state and are
likely to prove -unavailing in many cases, but the same was true of the state
law remedy at issue in Santa Fe. Finally, the court expressed reluctance "to
federalize the substantial portion of the law of corporations that deals with
290. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 466-68 (1977).
291. Id. at 470-71. The Court rested its holding on several bases. First, Section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5 were only intended to reach deception and manipulation. Neither was present
on these facts. Id. at 471-77. Second, the implied private right of action under Rule 10b-5
should not be extended to cases that do not involve deception or manipulation. Id. at 477-80.
292. See id. at 478-79.
293. Id. at 479.
294. Id. at 477.
295. Id. at 478.
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transactions in securities, particularly where established state policies of cor-
porate regulation would be overridden. "296 In view of the state law standards
discussed in Part V, of course, this is precisely what the federal insider
trading prohibition did."
To be sure, none of the Supreme Court's decisions squarely forbid either
federalizing the insider trading prohibition or creating a unique federal fiduci-
ary rule applicable to insider trading. At the very least, however, Santa Fe
and its ilk require one to ask why insider trading should be singled out for
special treatment. Given that all other corporate fiduciary duties have been
left to state law, what justifies creating a federal fiduciary duty against insider
trading?
Repealing the federal prohibition in fact would be the simplest means of
resolving the tension between Chiarella and Santa Fe. The simplest ap-
296. Id. at 479.
297. In Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, the Supreme Court reaffirmed what it
called the holding of Santa Fe that Section 10(b) does not reach mere breaches of fiduciary
duty. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1446 (1994). In United States
v. Bryan, the Fourth Circuit relied on Santa Fe and Central Bank in holding the misappropri-
ation theory invalid on grounds that it involves merely a breach of fiduciary duty. United
States v. Bryan, No. 94-5124, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 15893, at *37, 50-51 (4th Cir. June
27, 1995). The court opined that the only alternative to doing so "would be the effective
federalization of [fiduciary] relationships historically regulated by the states," which it held
would violate Santa Fe. Id. at *55. The court thus ignored the possibility proposed here of
treating the insider trading prohibition as a species of federal common law, with incorporation
of state law as the rule of decision.
Setting Bryan aside, the lower courts have generally treated Santa Fe as something to
be evaded, rather than followed. Some courts have permitted 10b-5 causes of action to lie
where the nondisclosure led plaintiffs to forego pursuing an available state law remedy. See,
e.g., Healey v. Catalyst Recovery, 616 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1980); Goldberg v. Meridor, 567
F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978). This approach has been sub-
jected to substantial criticism. See, e.g., Healey v. Catalyst Recovery, 616 F.2d 641, 651-61
(3d Cir. 1980) (Aldisert, J., dissenting); RICHARD W. JENNINGS ET AL., SECURrrIEs REGU-
LATION 1052-54 (7th ed. 1992). It allows litigants to end-run Santa Fe by pointing to a non-
disclosure or misrepresentation even though the bulk of their case goes to breach of fiduciary
duty. While it might be argued that liability is being imposed because of the nondisclosure
of the breach, rather than the breach itself, it has been held that failure to disclose a breach
of duty is not actionable under Rule lob-5. Biesenbach v. Guenther, 588 F.2d 400 (3d Cir.
1978); In re Sears, Roebuck & Co. Sec. Litig., 792 F. Supp. 977 (E.D. Pa. 1992); Merritt
v. Colonial Foods, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 910, 913-14 (D. Del. 1980). In any case, the lower
court approach imposes liability for failing to disclose information relevant not to making
investment decisions, the concern of the securities laws, but to making state law litigation
decisions, a matter wholly outside the scope of the securities laws. Finally, and most troub-
lingly, the lower court's chosen escape device ignores the thrust of Santa Fe by giving no
deference to the strong policy reasons laid out by the Supreme Court for refraining from
intruding federal law into a sphere traditionally left for state law.
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proach, however, is not always the best. As the following section explains,
there are good and sufficient reasons to retain a federal prohibition of insider
trading. None of those reasons, however, necessitates the creation of a unique
federal fidiiciary duty against insider trading. Nor do any of them resolve the
doctrinal tension between Chiarella and Santa Fe. Rather, that tension is best
resolved by adopting state law standards as the requisite fiduciary duty. This
approach strikes an appropriate balance between the federalism concerns
expressed by Santa Fe and the policies that favor federalizing the prohibition.
The Court's decision in Burks v. Lasker 298 is especially supportive of this
approach. In Burks, the Court applied state law governing termination of
derivative litigation to a case arising under the federal Investment Company
Act.299 Although the cause of action clearly arose under federal law, the
Court applied state law because state law "is the font of corporate directors'
powers" and because application of state law did not pose a "significant threat
to any identifiable federal policy or interest."" Burks thus strongly argues
in favor of using state law to supply the fiduciary duty element of the federal
insider trading prohibition. State law is the "font" of corporate fiduciary
duties, while we have seen that incorporation of state law poses no threat to
"any identifiable federal policy or interest."
Although the Supreme Court's decision in DeSylva v. Ballentine0' arose
outside the securities law area, it is also quite instructive. In that case the
Supreme Court considered what familial relationships were encompassed by
the term "children" as used in a federal statute. The Court looked to state law
for a definition of the term.3" It did so in large measure because there is no
federal law of domestic relations:
The scope of a federal right is, of course, a federal question, but that does not
mean that its content is not to be determined by state, rather than federal law. This
is especially true where a statute deals with a familial relationship; there is no
federal law of domestic relations, which is primarily a matter of state concern.'
From this perspective, DeSylva is an especially apt precedent for the insider
trading prohibition. Just as there was no general body of federal domestic
relations law, Santa Fe teaches that there is no general federal law of fiduciary
duty. Just as the Court incorporated state law in DeSylva, it thus should
incorporate state law here.
298. 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
299. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 477-78 (1979).
300. Id. at 478-79; accord Karmen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., 500 U.S. 90 (1991).
301. 351 U.S. 570 (1956).
302. DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580-82 (1956).
303. Id. at 580.
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c. The Comparative Advantage Argument
Despite Santa Fe, treating the problem of insider trading as a matter of
federal law and, in particular, preserving a primary enforcement role for the
Commission, is readily justifiable. As we have seen, the property rights
approach argues in favor of granting owners of information legal protection
against insider trading. While a rule against insider trading thus is socially
desirable, the costs of such a rule still must be taken into account. Those
costs can be broken down into three basic categories. Primary costs are the
injuries suffered by the owner of information used to inside trade. Secondary
costs are those incurred by the owner to deter and detect insider trading.
Tertiary costs are those incurred by society in operating the judicial system in
which enforcement of the rule takes place.
The difficulties associated with detecting and successfully prosecuting
insider trading make these costs very high. By one estimate, fewer than one
in five cases of insider trading is successfully prosecuted,' and in retrospect
that estimate probably is too high by several orders of magnitude. 305 It is
often very difficult to tell when insider trading is taking place, and even when
insider trading is suspected it is very difficult to identify the responsible party
if many people had access to the information. Finally, even when insider
trading is detected, it often can be difficult to build a persuasive case against
the inside trader.
Rational actors will take these factors into account when deciding
whether to inside trade. In economic terms, deterrence can be reduced to a
simple equation. A rational actor will be deterred only when the expected
sanction associated with an offense exceeds the expected benefit. The
expected sanction, in turn, is a function of the nominal sanction and the
probability of conviction. Because the latter factor is quite small, insider
trading is difficult to deter.
If the SEC has a comparative advantage vis-a-vis private parties in
enforcing insider trading rules, society can reduce the total cost associated
with regulating insider trading by allocating responsibility for doing so to the
Commission. That secondary costs will be lower follows a fortiori from the
Commission's comparative advantage. Primary costs also will be lower
because the Commission's comparative advantage will result in greater
deterrence for the same expenditure of resources.
304. Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 489-90.
305. According to another estimate, insider trading is the most common securities law
violation, but also is one of the most rarely prosecuted. Dooley, supra note 168, at 7-9. But
see Branson, supra note 89, at 294 (finding "no credible evidence that insider trading is
ubiquitous or even widespread").
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That the Commission has a comparative advantage is fairly easy to dem-
onstrate.' Virtually all private party insider trading lawsuits are parasitic on
SEC enforcement efforts, which is to say that the private party suit was
brought only after the SEC's proceeding became publicly known.31 This con-
dition holds because the police powers available to the Commission, but'not
to private parties, are essential to detecting insider trading. 308 Informants,
computer monitoring of stock transictions, and reporting of unusual activity
by self-regulatory organizations or market professionals are the usual ways in
which insider trading cases come to light.' As a practical matter, these tech-
niques are available only to public law enforcement agencies. In particular,
they are most readily available to the SEC.
Unlike private parties, who cannot compel discovery until a nonfrivolous
case has been filed, the Commission can impound trading records and compel
testimony simply because its suspicions are aroused.30 As the agency charged
with regulating broker-dealers and self-regulatory organizations, the Commis-
sion also is uniquely positioned to extract cooperation from securities profes-
sionals in conducting investigations. 31" Finally, the SEC is statutorily author-
ized to pay bounties to informants, which is particularly important in light of
306. Professor Romano questions whether "the difficulty of enforcing an insider trading
prohibition is significantly lessened when shifted to the public sector.." ROMANO, supra note
199, at 103. She cites two studies that conclude that public enforcement efforts have not
deterred insider trading. Id. These studies, however, do not answer the real question. The
issue is not whether public enforcement deters insider trading, but whether it is more effective
in doing so than a regime of purely private enforcement. The study by Professor Dooley, for
example, which Romano cites as finding that public enforcement is "ineffective," id., also
concludes that private enforcement is wholly parasitic on public enforcement. Dooley, supra
note 168, at 20.
For a detailed analysis of the Commission's comparative advantages vis-a-vis private
parties in detecting insider trading, albeit one that is skeptical of the efficacy of the Commis-
sion's efforts, see DOOLEY, supra note 132, at IV-224 to -242.
307. Dooley, supra note 168, at 20.
308. Id.
309. The techniques for detecting insider trading, and the limitations inherent in their
use, were described in several congressional hearings during the 1980s. See, e.g., Insider
Trading, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the Comm.
on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); Securities Regulation Issues,
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); Insider Trading, Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
310. Dooley, supra note 168, at 20.
311. Id.
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the key role informants played in breaking most of the big insider trading
cases of the 1980s.312
Internationalization of the securities markets is yet another reason for
believing the SEC has a comparative advantage in detecting and prosecuting
insider trading. Sophisticated insider trading schemes often make use of off-
shore entities or even off-shore markets. The difficulties inherent in extra-
territorial investigations and litigation, especially in countries with strong
bank secrecy laws, probably would preclude private parties from dealing
effectively with insider trading involving off-shore activities. In contrast,
the SEC has developed memoranda of understanding with a number of key
foreign nations, which provide for reciprocal assistance in prosecuting
insider trading and other securities law violations." 3 The SEC's ability to
investigate international insider trading cases was further enhanced by the
1988 act, which included provisions designed to encourage foreign
governments to cooperate with SEC investigations." 4
Despite the SEC's demonstrable comparative advantage, it is worth
considering one further argument against the federal prohibition. Jonathan
Macey concedes that insider trading is difficult to detect. He further
concedes that centralized monitoring of insider trading by the SEC and the
self-regulatory organizations within the securities industry may be more
efficient than private party efforts to detect insider trading. He nevertheless
draws a distinction between SEC monitoring of insider trading and a federal
prohibition of insider trading. Macey contends that the SEC should monitor
insider trading but refer detected cases to the affected corporation for private
315prosecution.
Macey's argument is an interesting and sophisticated one, but there are
counter-points. First, we know from experience with the present legal
regime that SEC monitoring detects only a small percentage of insider
trading cases. Private party enforcement of insider trading rules, even
supplemented by law enforcement monitoring, thus is unlikely to provide an
adequate deterrence. Because the probability of detection is quite low, and
the potential gains are quite high, the nominal sanction must be quite high
in order to deter insider trading. This is the basic economic rationale behind
312. See Kraswell, supra note 190, at 164-66.
313. Id. at 172-73.
314. Id. at 171.
315. MAcEY, supra note 190, at 40-41. For quite different reasons, Professor Branson
had earlier proposed a similar regime under which the SEC's enforcement activities would
be confined "to oversight, with self-regulation by those entities having proprietary rights in
the information." Branson, supra note 89, at 302.
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the draconian penalties imp6sed on insider trading by the federal securities
laws.316 They combine public law enforcement, which enhances the
probability of detection, with onerous criminal and civil sanctions, which
maximize the nominal sanction. In contrast, the sanction presently available
in private party litigation is limited to actual damages or disgorgement of
actual profits.317 While that sanction could be increased, perhaps by creation
of the same sort of treble money remedy that exists under the antitrust laws,
it may well be the case that criminal sanctions are needed for effective deter-
rence.
318
Because insider trading is difficult to prosecute even when detected,
allocating prosecutorial responsibility to the SEC may also be justified on
institutional expertise grounds. The Commission's enforcement staff will
handle- many more insider trading cases than will counsel representing
private corporations. As such, they will develop greater expertise in
handling such prosecutions, which further enhances the Commission's
competitive advantage in dealing with insider trading.
In any case, the notion of creating a regime in which public agencies
detect wrongdoing, but then leave enforcement to private parties strikes me
as odd. Such regimes are rare, at best. Instead, where enforcement or other
costs are such that private enforcement of property rights is difficult, the law
typically uses the state's regulatory powers as a substitute for creating a
property right.319 Insider trading, in fact, is a classic example of a regula-
tory regime that acts as a substitute for private property rights.
This analysis answers the question posed in the preceding section;
namely, why insider trading is an appropriate matter of federal concern in
light of the Supreme Court's consistent holdings that fiduciary duties are a
matter.for state law. It is solely because of the SEC's comparative advantage
in detecting and prosecuting insider trading that it is appropriately treated
differently than other breaches of corporate fiduciary duty. Other duty of
316. Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 488-91.
317. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1988).
318. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, INSIDER TRADING AS AN AGENCY PROBLEM, in
PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 81 (J. Pratt & R. Zeckhauser eds.,
1985). Professor Romano identifies "a practical weakness with this explanation., Until the
1980s, cases seeking criminal penalties for insider trading, rather than civil sanctions, were
unheard of." ROMANO, supra note 199, at 102. This is not as serious an objection, however,
as it may seem at first blush. Recall that prior to Chiarella, key interest groups were at risk
of being charged with insider trading. See supra notes 261-62 and accompanying text. Their
exposure may have discouraged vigorous enforcement of the insider trading laws, which
would have protected all potential subjects of criminal enforcement.
319. See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
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loyalty questions, such as usurpation of corporate opportunities and inter-
ested directors transactions, are appropriately left to private party enforce-
ment under state corporate law because they are both rare and comparatively
easy to detect and prosecute. In a public corporation, opportunities to inside
trade are likely to be much more common than are opportunities for self-
dealing transactions with the corporation. Insider trading is also easier to
hide. In contrast to insider trading, which is conducted on impersonal stock
exchanges and lends itself to secrecy, transacting with the corporation
necessarily takes place in the open. Nor is it easy to usurp a corporate
opportunity without that fact coming to light. Only the much greater
likelihood of insider trading, coupled with the degree of difficulty associated
with detecting and prosecuting it, justifies treating it as an exception to the
Santa Fe rule.
This leads us to the second counter-point to Macey's argument, which
is that insofar as it is intended as a proposal for law reform, it ignores the
implications of his own analysis of the politics of insider trading. If Dooley
and Macey are correct, repealing the federal prohibition is politically
impracticable. There is no organized constituency that favors doing so,
while attempting to do so would generate strong interest group opposition.
Doing so, moreover, would run counter to the institutional interests of the
SEC and Congress. If politics is the art of the possible, so too is law
reform. At best, critics of the prohibition can hope only for judicial
tinkering at the margins of how insider trading is defined.
Incorporation of state law as the basis for the requisite fiduciary duty
is precisely the sort of marginal change that ought to be sought by propo-
nents of reforming the prohibition. Doing so is politically practical (at least
in comparison to repealing the prohibition), doctrinally sound, and theoret-
ically justifiable. Incorporating state law is thus preferable both to proposals
to create a unique federal fiduciary duty applicable to insider trading or to
repeal the federal prohibition.
3. A Modest Proposal for Reform
In sum, regulation of insider trading is a matter of federal concern not
because it implicates important federal policies, but simply because regu-
lating insider trading is an important societal goal and the federal govern-
ment is able to accomplish that goal more efficiently than are states or
private parties. But while efficiency of enforcement justifies a federal
prohibition of insider trading, it does not justify creating a unique federal
definition of insider trading. To be sure, if we adopt state law fiduciary duty
principles as the rule of decision, there will be cases in which an enforce-
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ment proceeding is derailed because the defendant's conduct violated no
fiduciary duty under applicable state law.' But so what? This is true
whenever state standards are incorporated into federal common law. Even
if a uniform federal rule were adopted, moreover, there would still be cases
falling outside its scope.
It is also important to note that while insider trading cases are often
brought by the federal government and arise under federal statute, insider
trading does not directly affect the rights of the United States or threaten to
impose liability on it. Rather, as the breach of fiduciary duty requirement
itself suggests, insider trading mainly implicates the rights and obligations
of private parties. Courts are more likely to impose uniform national rules
in the former case than in the latter.32
The bottom line, however, is whether application of state law would
frustrate the accomplishment of federal policies. The key point here is the
absence of any public-regarding federal policies at stake in regulating insider
trading. To the contrary, incorporating state law is the approach most
consistent with the policies of the federal securities laws. Creation of the
federal insider trading prohibition involved federalizing an area traditionally
regulated by the states. As we have seen, this easily might have proved the
first wedge in federalizing the entire body of state corporate law. Santa Fe
blunted that threat, but the insider trading prohibition still lingers on the
federal stage.
The federalism policies reflected in Santa Fe are deeply imbedded in the
Supreme Court's securities jurisprudence, as reflected by Burks and other
cases. Clearly establishing state law as the rule of decision would go a long
320. In the analogous context of borrowing state statutes of limitations for application
to implied federal rights of action, the Supreme Court has indicated that a uniform federal
rule is appropriate if the use of state rules would result in forum shopping. Lampf, Pleva,
Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilberston, 501 U.S. 350, 357 (1991). In this context, the
risk of forum shopping is minimal. Long-standing choice-of-law rules direct that questions
of breaches of fiduciary duty by corporate officers and directors are governed by the law of
the state of incorporation. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 309 (1969).
Similar choice-of-law rules governing misconduct by agents would apply to misappropriation
cases. Hence, for most insider trading cases, forum shopping is not a concern.
In Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), the Supreme Court observed that
"Federal Courts applying a 'federal fiduciary principle' under rule lob-5 could be expected
to depart from state fiduciary standards at least to the extent necessary to ensure uniformity
within the federal system." Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 479. This is consistent with
Lampf s holding that a unique federal common-law rule should be created when a uniform
federal standard is required. The basic thesis of this article, of course, is that insider trading
should not be governed by a "federal fiduciary principle," but by state fiduciary principles.
321. See Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25 (1977).
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way towards reconciling the prohibition and Santa Fe. Recall that incorpo-
ration of state law is appropriate when there is no body of applicable federal
law upon which to draw. Because Santa Fe precluded the development of
a general body of federal fiduciary law, this principle is especially apt in the
present context.
More important, by incorporating state law courts would minimize the
extent to which the federal insider trading prohibition intrudes on the state's
legitimate zone of regulatory authority over fiduciary duties. As such, if
frustration of federal policy is the basic test, state law should be incorpo-
rated. Doing so would advance the federalism policies of the securities
laws, without adversely affecting any other policy goals of those laws.
State law fiduciary duty principles still would be the appropriate rule of
decision, however, even if Santa Fe had never been decided. In light of the
property rights rationale for regulating insider trading, the prohibition should
extend only to cases in which property rights are threatened. As we have
seen, federal insider trading jurisprudence in some areas has failed to draw
the distinctions required by a property rights approach. In contrast, as the
debate between the Diamond and Freeman courts demonstrates, adoption of
state law fiduciary duties as the rule of decision will force courts to ask the
right questions because those duties are defined by reference to whether the
agent's conduct threatens the principal's property rights in information.
Indeed, the very diversity and multiplicity of state law fiduciary duty rules
will force courts to ask whether liability is appropriate in a particular case,
in contrast to the present single federal fiduciary standard under which courts
all too often fail to engage in any meaningful analysis of whether the
prohibition ought to extend to the case at bar.
In sum, it is appropriate for insider trading to be regulated by the
federal government. There is no reason, however, for that regulation to take
the form of a unique nationwide rule of federal common law. Instead, the
fiduciary duty element required by the federal definition of insider trading
should be supplied solely by state corporate law.
VII. Conclusion
This Article was intended to answer a question posed in my prior work
on insider trading by lawyers; namely, to what extent are state law fiduciary
duties relevant to the federal insider trading prohibition?3' In studying that
question, one inevitably concludes that the emperor has no clothes. Courts
have systematically turned a blind eye to the myriad of doctrinal problems
322. Bainbridge, supra note 113, at3 n.5.
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inherent in the current prohibition. In this Article, I offer the emperor at
least a fig leaf. Instead of proposing repeal of the prohibition, which seems
politically impractical and unwarranted as a matter of policy, I have pro-
posed a mechanism for rationalizing the prohibition and thereby assuaging
the doctrinal conflicts that beset it.
Insider trading is not defined in the federal securities statutes. Instead,
its definition has evolved through a process of common-law adjudication.
At the core of the resulting rule is a requirement that the alleged inside trade
constitute a breach of the trader's fiduciary duty to refrain from self-dealing
in confidential information. Once the substantive definition of insider
trading is viewed as a species of federal common law, the question arises
whether federal courts should incorporate state law as the rule of decision or
create a unique federal standard. This Article has demonstrated that the
insider trading prohibition can be justified only as a mechanism for pro-
tecting property rights in information. As such, the prohibition has rela-
tively little to do with the traditional securities regulation concerns of
disclosure and fraud. To the contrary, insider trading became a matter of
federal concern because of the SEC's self-interest and that of some of its
regulatory constituents. To be sure, the exigencies of detecting and prose-
cuting insider trading warrant a continuing federal regulatory. role. Because
there is no significant federal policy interest at stake, however, there is no
reason to create a unique federal rule defining insider trading. Instead,
courts should adopt state law fiduciary duty principles as the rule of
decision.
Granted, reliance on state law will complicate insider trading prosecu-
tions. But no more so than in any other case where state standards are
incorporated into federal common law. in any case, there are affirmative
reasons to adopt state law as the rule of decision. By acknowledging that
insider trading is primarily a matter for state law, like all other questions of
fiduciary duty, this approach accords proper deference to the states' position
as the primary regulator of corporate governance questions. Finally,
because state law fiduciary duty rules are designed to protect property rights,
looking to them to define insider trading will more clearly tie the prohibition
to the rationale for regulating insider trading.
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